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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-53360 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use As per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area to reside in the GHCB's shared buffer. Note, things like Page State Change (PSC) requests _rely_ on this behavior, as the guest can't provide a length when making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by the size of the shared buffer. Failure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a malicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap layout information. setup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2), where exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields a 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer holds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only entries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds. snp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253) but NOT against the actual buffer size: idx_end = hdr->end_entry; if (idx_end >= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) { // checks 253, not buffer snp_complete_psc(svm, ...); return 1; } for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; idx++) { entry_start = entries[idx]; // OOB when idx >= 2 The guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+] which are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry: - The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle) - If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806) - If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest) The guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range (cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly hit different slab positions. By exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can: - OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure) - OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption) - Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs E.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module produces 73 KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32 The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX) Breakdown: 62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation) 7 slab-use-after-free 4 use-after-free All credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer! [sean: write changelog] | ||||
| CVE-2026-53187 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/core: Validate cpu_id against nr_cpu_ids in DMAH alloc The cpu_id attribute supplied by user space through UVERBS_ATTR_ALLOC_DMAH_CPU_ID is passed directly to cpumask_test_cpu() without first verifying that the value is within the valid CPU range. Passing such untrusted data to cpumask_test_cpu() may lead to an out-of-bounds read of the underlying cpumask bitmap: the helper expands to a test_bit() that indexes the bitmap by cpu_id / BITS_PER_LONG with no bound check. In addition, on kernels built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS it trips the WARN_ON_ONCE() in cpumask_check(); combined with panic_on_warn this turns a bad user input into a machine reboot. Reject any cpu_id that is not smaller than nr_cpu_ids with -EINVAL before it is used. Reported by Smatch. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53005 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Drop all SCM attributes for SOCKMAP. SOCKMAP can hide inflight fd from AF_UNIX GC. When a socket in SOCKMAP receives skb with inflight fd, sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() looks up the mapped socket and enqueue skb to its psock->ingress_skb. Since neither the old nor the new GC can inspect the psock queue, the hidden skb leaks the inflight sockets. Note that this cannot be detected via kmemleak because inflight sockets are linked to a global list. In addition, SOCKMAP redirect breaks the Tarjan-based GC's assumption that unix_edge.successor is always alive, which is no longer true once skb is redirected, resulting in use-after-free below. [0] Moreover, SOCKMAP does not call scm_stat_del() properly, so unix_show_fdinfo() could report an incorrect fd count. sk_msg_recvmsg() does not support any SCM attributes in the first place. Let's drop all SCM attributes before passing skb to the SOCKMAP layer. [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_del_edges (net/unix/garbage.c:118 net/unix/garbage.c:181 net/unix/garbage.c:251) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888125362670 by task kworker/56:1/496 CPU: 56 UID: 0 PID: 496 Comm: kworker/56:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-00263-gb9d8b856689d #3 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597) unix_del_edges (net/unix/garbage.c:118 net/unix/garbage.c:181 net/unix/garbage.c:251) unix_destroy_fpl (net/unix/garbage.c:317) unix_destruct_scm (./include/net/scm.h:80 ./include/net/scm.h:86 net/unix/af_unix.c:1976) sk_psock_backlog (./include/linux/skbuff.h:?) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:?) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:?) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:438) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:258) </TASK> Allocated by task 955: kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:58 mm/kasan/common.c:78) __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:369) kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:4539) sk_prot_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2240) sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2301) unix_create1 (net/unix/af_unix.c:1099) unix_create (net/unix/af_unix.c:1169) __sock_create (net/socket.c:1606) __sys_socketpair (net/socket.c:1811) __x64_sys_socketpair (net/socket.c:1863 net/socket.c:1860 net/socket.c:1860) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:?) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Freed by task 496: kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:58 mm/kasan/common.c:78) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:587) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:287) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:6165) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2282 net/core/sock.c:2384) sk_psock_destroy (./include/net/sock.h:?) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:?) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:?) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:438) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:258) | ||||
| CVE-2026-53002 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: remove sprintf usage Replace it with scnprintf, the buffer sizes are expected to be large enough to hold the result, no need for snprintf+overflow check. Increase buffer size in mangle_content_len() while at it. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in vsnprintf+0xea5/0x1270 Write of size 1 at addr [..] vsnprintf+0xea5/0x1270 sprintf+0xb1/0xe0 mangle_content_len+0x1ac/0x280 nf_nat_sdp_session+0x1cc/0x240 process_sdp+0x8f8/0xb80 process_invite_request+0x108/0x2b0 process_sip_msg+0x5da/0xf50 sip_help_tcp+0x45e/0x780 nf_confirm+0x34d/0x990 [..] | ||||
| CVE-2026-52981 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: neigh: let neigh_xmit take skb ownership neigh_xmit always releases the skb, except when no neighbour table is found. But even the first added user of neigh_xmit (mpls) relied on neigh_xmit to release the skb (or queue it for tx). sashiko reported: If neigh_xmit() is called with an uninitialized neighbor table (for example, NEIGH_ND_TABLE when IPv6 is disabled), it returns -EAFNOSUPPORT and bypasses its internal out_kfree_skb error path. Because the return value of neigh_xmit() is ignored here, does this leak the SKB? Assume full ownership and remove the last code path that doesn't xmit or free skb. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46120 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip6_gre: Use cached t->net in ip6erspan_changelink(). After commit 5e72ce3e3980 ("net: ipv6: Use link netns in newlink() of rtnl_link_ops"), ip6erspan_newlink() correctly resolves the per-netns ip6gre hash via link_net. ip6erspan_changelink() was not converted in that series and still uses dev_net(dev), which diverges from the device's creation netns after IFLA_NET_NS_FD migration. This re-inserts the tunnel into the wrong per-netns hash. The original netns keeps a stale entry. When that netns is later destroyed, ip6gre_exit_rtnl_net() walks the stale entry, producing a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN, followed by a kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c (LIST_POISON1) in unregister_netdevice_many_notify(). Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user --map-root-user --net). ip6gre_changelink() earlier in the same file already uses the cached t->net; only ip6erspan_changelink() has the wrong shape. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46116 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in __xfrm_state_delete KASAN reproduces a slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete()'s hlist_del_rcu calls under syzkaller load on linux-6.12.y stable (reproduced on 6.12.47, also reachable via the same code path on torvalds/master and on the ipsec tree). Nine unique signatures cluster in the xfrm_state lifecycle, the load-bearing one being: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __hlist_del include/linux/list.h:990 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hlist_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:516 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881198bcb70 by task kworker/u8:9/435 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: __hlist_del / hlist_del_rcu __xfrm_state_delete xfrm_state_delete xfrm_state_flush xfrm_state_fini ops_exit_list cleanup_net The other observed signatures hit the same slab object from __xfrm_state_lookup, xfrm_alloc_spi, __xfrm_state_insert and an OOB write variant of __xfrm_state_delete, all on the byseq/byspi hash chains. __xfrm_state_delete() guards its byseq and byspi unhashes with value-based predicates: if (x->km.seq) hlist_del_rcu(&x->byseq); if (x->id.spi) hlist_del_rcu(&x->byspi); while everywhere else in the file (e.g. state_cache, state_cache_input) the safer hlist_unhashed() check is used. xfrm_alloc_spi() sets x->id.spi = newspi inside xfrm_state_lock and then immediately inserts into byspi, but a path that observes x->id.spi != 0 outside of xfrm_state_lock can still skip-or-hit the byspi unhash inconsistently with whether x is actually on the list. The same holds for x->km.seq versus byseq, and the bydst/bysrc unhashes have no predicate at all, so a second __xfrm_state_delete() on the same object writes through LIST_POISON pprev. The defensive change here: - Use hlist_del_init_rcu() instead of hlist_del_rcu() on bydst, bysrc, byseq and byspi so a second deletion is a no-op rather than a write through LIST_POISON pprev. The byseq/byspi nodes are already initialised in xfrm_state_alloc(). - Test hlist_unhashed() rather than the value predicate for byseq/byspi, so the unhash decision tracks list state rather than mutable scalar fields. Empirical verification: applied this patch on top of v6.12.47, rebuilt, and re-ran the same syzkaller harness for 1h16m on a previously-crashy configuration that produced ~100 hits each of slab-use-after-free Read in xfrm_alloc_spi / Read in __xfrm_state_lookup / Write in __xfrm_state_delete. After the patch, 7.1M execs across 32 VMs at ~1550 exec/sec produced zero xfrm_state UAF/OOB hits. /proc/slabinfo confirms the xfrm_state slab is actively allocated and freed during the run (~143 KiB resident), so the fuzzer is still exercising those code paths -- they just no longer crash. Reproduction: - Linux 6.12.47 x86_64 + KASAN_GENERIC + KASAN_INLINE + KCOV - syzkaller @ 746545b8b1e4c3a128db8652b340d3df90ce61db - 32 QEMU/KVM VMs x 2 vCPU on AWS c5.metal bare metal - 9 unique signatures collected in ~9h, all within xfrm_state lifecycle | ||||
| CVE-2026-46102 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: strparser: fix skb_head leak in strp_abort_strp() When the stream parser is aborted, for example after a message assembly timeout, it can still hold a reference to a partially assembled message in strp->skb_head. That skb is not released in strp_abort_strp(), which leaks the partially assembled message and can be triggered repeatedly to exhaust memory. Fix this by freeing strp->skb_head and resetting the parser state in the abort path. Leave strp_stop() unchanged so final cleanup still happens in strp_done() after the work and timer have been synchronized. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45991 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: fix partition descriptor append bookkeeping Mounting a crafted UDF image with repeated partition descriptors can trigger a heap out-of-bounds write in part_descs_loc[]. handle_partition_descriptor() deduplicates entries by partition number, but appended slots never record partnum. As a result duplicate Partition Descriptors are appended repeatedly and num_part_descs keeps growing. Once the table is full, the growth path still sizes the allocation from partnum even though inserts are indexed by num_part_descs. If partnum is already aligned to PART_DESC_ALLOC_STEP, ALIGN(partnum, step) can keep the old capacity and the next append writes past the end of the table. Store partnum in the appended slot and size growth from the next append count so deduplication and capacity tracking follow the same model. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43501 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: rpl: reserve mac_len headroom when recompressed SRH grows ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() decompresses an RFC 6554 Source Routing Header, swaps the next segment into ipv6_hdr->daddr, recompresses, then pulls the old header and pushes the new one plus the IPv6 header back. The recompressed header can be larger than the received one when the swap reduces the common-prefix length the segments share with daddr (CmprI=0, CmprE>0, seg[0][0] != daddr[0] gives the maximum +8 bytes). pskb_expand_head() was gated on segments_left == 0, so on earlier segments the push consumed unchecked headroom. Once skb_push() leaves fewer than skb->mac_len bytes in front of data, skb_mac_header_rebuild()'s call to: skb_set_mac_header(skb, -skb->mac_len); will store (data - head) - mac_len into the u16 mac_header field, which wraps to ~65530, and the following memmove() writes mac_len bytes ~64KiB past skb->head. A single AF_INET6/SOCK_RAW/IPV6_HDRINCL packet over lo with a two segment type-3 SRH (CmprI=0, CmprE=15) reaches headroom 8 after one pass; KASAN reports a 14-byte OOB write in ipv6_rthdr_rcv. Fix this by expanding the head whenever the remaining room is less than the push size plus mac_len, and request that much extra so the rebuilt MAC header fits afterwards. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43279 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: Add sanity check for OOB writes at silencing At silencing the playback URB packets in the implicit fb mode before the actual playback, we blindly assume that the received packets fit with the buffer size. But when the setup in the capture stream differs from the playback stream (e.g. due to the USB core limitation of max packet size), such an inconsistency may lead to OOB writes to the buffer, resulting in a crash. For addressing it, add a sanity check of the transfer buffer size at prepare_silent_urb(), and stop the data copy if the received data overflows. Also, report back the transfer error properly from there, too. Note that this doesn't fix the root cause of the playback error itself, but this merely covers the kernel Oops. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43206 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix out-of-bounds write in kfd_event_page_set() The kfd_event_page_set() function writes KFD_SIGNAL_EVENT_LIMIT * 8 bytes via memset without checking the buffer size parameter. This allows unprivileged userspace to trigger an out-of bounds kernel memory write by passing a small buffer, leading to potential privilege escalation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43112 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/smb/client: fix out-of-bounds read in cifs_sanitize_prepath When cifs_sanitize_prepath is called with an empty string or a string containing only delimiters (e.g., "/"), the current logic attempts to check *(cursor2 - 1) before cursor2 has advanced. This results in an out-of-bounds read. This patch adds an early exit check after stripping prepended delimiters. If no path content remains, the function returns NULL. The bug was identified via manual audit and verified using a standalone test case compiled with AddressSanitizer, which triggered a SEGV on affected inputs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43078 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl When page reassignment was added to af_alg_pull_tsgl the original loop wasn't updated so it may try to reassign one more page than necessary. Add the check to the reassignment so that this does not happen. Also update the comment which still refers to the obsolete offset argument. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43051 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: fix out-of-bounds read in wacom_intuos_bt_irq The wacom_intuos_bt_irq() function processes Bluetooth HID reports without sufficient bounds checking. A maliciously crafted short report can trigger an out-of-bounds read when copying data into the wacom structure. Specifically, report 0x03 requires at least 22 bytes to safely read the processed data and battery status, while report 0x04 (which falls through to 0x03) requires 32 bytes. Add explicit length checks for these report IDs and log a warning if a short report is received. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31669 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: fix slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established The ehash table lookups are lockless and rely on SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to guarantee socket memory stability during RCU read-side critical sections. Both tcp_prot and tcpv6_prot have their slab caches created with this flag via proto_register(). However, MPTCP's mptcp_subflow_init() copies tcpv6_prot into tcpv6_prot_override during inet_init() (fs_initcall, level 5), before inet6_init() (module_init/device_initcall, level 6) has called proto_register(&tcpv6_prot). At that point, tcpv6_prot.slab is still NULL, so tcpv6_prot_override.slab remains NULL permanently. This causes MPTCP v6 subflow child sockets to be allocated via kmalloc (falling into kmalloc-4k) instead of the TCPv6 slab cache. The kmalloc-4k cache lacks SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so when these sockets are freed without SOCK_RCU_FREE (which is cleared for child sockets by design), the memory can be immediately reused. Concurrent ehash lookups under rcu_read_lock can then access freed memory, triggering a slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established. Fix this by splitting the IPv6-specific initialization out of mptcp_subflow_init() into a new mptcp_subflow_v6_init(), called from mptcp_proto_v6_init() before protocol registration. This ensures tcpv6_prot_override.slab correctly inherits the SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slab cache. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31607 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response, usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the *original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT. A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region. KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40) The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point. On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets. This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the response value against the original allocation size. Kelvin Mbogo's series ("usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in usbip_recv_iso()", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves; this patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its source -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and using the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit. Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() safely return early. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31533 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit 859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests"), has a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the scatterlist entry. When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the scatterlist entry (sge->offset, sge->length) and decrements ctx->encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and double-restoring the scatterlist. The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the freed record. Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled encrypt_pending and sge restoration. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31528 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Make sure to use pmu_ctx->pmu for groups Oliver reported that x86_pmu_del() ended up doing an out-of-bound memory access when group_sched_in() fails and needs to roll back. This *should* be handled by the transaction callbacks, but he found that when the group leader is a software event, the transaction handlers of the wrong PMU are used. Despite the move_group case in perf_event_open() and group_sched_in() using pmu_ctx->pmu. Turns out, inherit uses event->pmu to clone the events, effectively undoing the move_group case for all inherited contexts. Fix this by also making inherit use pmu_ctx->pmu, ensuring all inherited counters end up in the same pmu context. Similarly, __perf_event_read() should use equally use pmu_ctx->pmu for the group case. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31525 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix undefined behavior in interpreter sdiv/smod for INT_MIN The BPF interpreter's signed 32-bit division and modulo handlers use the kernel abs() macro on s32 operands. The abs() macro documentation (include/linux/math.h) explicitly states the result is undefined when the input is the type minimum. When DST contains S32_MIN (0x80000000), abs((s32)DST) triggers undefined behavior and returns S32_MIN unchanged on arm64/x86. This value is then sign-extended to u64 as 0xFFFFFFFF80000000, causing do_div() to compute the wrong result. The verifier's abstract interpretation (scalar32_min_max_sdiv) computes the mathematically correct result for range tracking, creating a verifier/interpreter mismatch that can be exploited for out-of-bounds map value access. Introduce abs_s32() which handles S32_MIN correctly by casting to u32 before negating, avoiding signed overflow entirely. Replace all 8 abs((s32)...) call sites in the interpreter's sdiv32/smod32 handlers. s32 is the only affected case -- the s64 division/modulo handlers do not use abs(). | ||||