| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: oss: Serialize readq reset state with q->lock
snd_seq_oss_readq_clear() resets qlen, head, and tail without
q->lock even though the normal reader and producer paths serialize the
same ring state under that spinlock. A reset can therefore race
snd_seq_oss_readq_free() or snd_seq_oss_readq_put_event() and leave
stale records in the queue, drop freshly queued ones, or report the
wrong readiness after wakeup. KCSAN reports a data race between
snd_seq_oss_readq_clear() and snd_seq_oss_readq_free().
Take q->lock while clearing the ring and resetting input_time. Factor
the enqueue logic into a caller-locked helper so
snd_seq_oss_readq_put_timestamp() updates its suppression state under
the same lock instead of racing the reset path.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the
order within that path:
reset path: locked readq updater:
1. snd_seq_oss_reset() or 1. A reader or callback producer
release reaches takes q->lock on the same queue.
snd_seq_oss_readq_clear().
2. snd_seq_oss_readq_clear() 2. The updater tests or modifies
resets qlen, head, tail, qlen, head, and tail.
and input_time.
3. snd_seq_oss_readq_clear() 3. The updater completes its
wakes sleepers on read-modify-write sequence.
q->midi_sleep.
4. Without q->lock, the reset 4. The resulting ring state drives
can overlap the locked later reads and readiness.
update.
KCSAN reports:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in snd_seq_oss_readq_clear /
snd_seq_oss_readq_free
write to 0xffff8881069fe608 of 4 bytes by task 120516 on cpu 0:
snd_seq_oss_readq_free+0x6c/0x80
snd_seq_oss_read+0xcb/0x250
odev_read+0x38/0x60
vfs_read+0xff/0x600
ksys_read+0xb4/0x140
__x64_sys_read+0x46/0x60
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x2f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
read to 0xffff8881069fe608 of 4 bytes by task 120517 on cpu 1:
snd_seq_oss_readq_clear+0x1f/0x90
snd_seq_oss_reset+0xa7/0xf0
snd_seq_oss_ioctl+0x6f6/0x7e0
odev_ioctl+0x56/0xc0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xd1/0x120
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x2f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
value changed: 0x00000001 -> 0x00000000 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: ete: Always save state on power down
System register ETMs and ETE are unlikely to be preserved on CPU power
down. The ETE DT binding also never documented
"arm,coresight-loses-context-with-cpu" so nobody would have legitimately
been able to use that binding to fix it and ACPI has no such binding at
all.
Fix it by hard coding the setting for sysreg ETMs (ETE is always sysreg)
or ACPI boots. Use a local variable when setting up save_state so that
it's immune to concurrent probing when devices have different
configurations which is an issue with modifying the global.
This fixes the following error when using Coresight with ACPI on the FVP
which supports CPU PM:
coresight ete0: External agent took claim tag
WARNING: drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-core.c:248 at coresight_disclaim_device_unlocked+0xe0/0xe8, CPU#0: perf/117 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: processor_idle: Mark LPI enter functions as __cpuidle
When function tracing or Kprobes is enabled, entering an ACPI Low
Power Idle (LPI) state triggers the following RCU splat:
RCU not on for: acpi_idle_lpi_enter+0x4/0xd8
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 0 at include/linux/trace_recursion.h:162 function_trace_call+0x1e8/0x228
The acpi_idle_lpi_enter() function is invoked within the cpuidle
path after RCU has already been disabled for the current local CPU.
Consequently, ftrace's function_trace_call() expects RCU to be
actively watching before recording trace data, emitting a warning
if it is not.
Fix this by annotating acpi_idle_lpi_enter(), the generic __weak
stub, and the RISC-V implementation of acpi_processor_ffh_lpi_enter()
with __cpuidle. This moves these functions into the '.cpuidle.text'
section, implicitly disabling ftrace instrumentation (notrace) along
this sensitive path and preventing trace-induced RCU warnings during
idle entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
watchdog: at91sam9_wdt: prevent timer rearm during teardown
at91_ping() rearms the watchdog timer from its callback. timer_delete()
neither waits for a running callback nor prevents it from rearming the
timer, so probe failure or driver removal can leave the timer accessing the
devm-allocated at91wdt after it has been freed.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() on both teardown paths. It waits for a running
callback and rejects any attempt by the callback to rearm the timer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: hold sk properly in iso_conn_ready
sk deref in iso_conn_ready must be done either under conn->lock, or
holding a refcount, to avoid concurrent close. conn->sk is currently
accessed without either:
[Task 1] [Task 2]
iso_sock_release
iso_conn_ready
sk = conn->sk
lock_sock(sk)
conn->sk = NULL
lock_sock(sk)
release_sock(sk)
iso_sock_kill(sk)
UAF on sk deref
Fix possible UAF by holding sk refcount in iso_conn_ready(). Also
recheck after lock_sock that the socket is still valid. Adjust locking
so conn->sk is cleared only under lock_sock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dlm: fix add msg handle in send_queue ordered
In a benchmark scenario triggering a lot of requests that triggers a lot
of DLM messages on the network it can be that the mh->seq is not ordered
according the oldest seq number. This ordering is required by
dlm_receive_ack as "before(mh->seq, seq)" will stop to check for older
sequence numbers that are ordered in the tail of "node->send_queue".
The side effects of not having it correct ordered regarding
"before(mh->seq, seq)" are refcounting issues and use-after free.
I only was able to reproduce this issue in a experimental DLM branch
and a user space DLM benchmark that uses io_uring. After changing this I
don't experienced any refcounting with the sending buffer issues anymore. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: oss: Fix UAF at handling events with embedded SysEx data
The OSS sequencer processes the input MIDI bytes into a sequencer
event to be dispatched later (in snd_seq_oss_midi_putc() called from
snd_seq_oss_process_event()). When it's a SysEx data, the event
record contains data.ext.ptr pointer to the original SysEx bytes, and
the referred data is copied into the pool afterwards at dispatching.
The problem is that, if the sequencer port gets closed concurrently
before the dispatch, the OSS sequencer core also releases the
resources (in snd_seq_oss_midi_check_exit_port()), while the pending
event may hold a stale pointer, eventually leading to a UAF at a later
dispatch.
Fortunately, there is already a refcounting mechanism (snd_use_lock_t)
for the OSS MIDI device access, and for addressing the issue above, we
just need to extend the refcount until the event gets dispatched.
This patch extends snd_seq_oss_process_event() to give back the
refcount object, which is in turn released after calling the sequencer
dispatcher with the given event in the caller side.
According to the original report, KASAN report as below:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in snd_seq_event_dup+0x40c/0x470
RIP: 0033:0x7f2cb66a6340
Read of size 6
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xb0 (?:?)
print_report+0xd1/0x650 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x1a7/0x340 (?:?)
kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x64/0x200 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xf7/0x130 (?:?)
snd_seq_event_dup+0x40c/0x470 (?:?)
kasan_check_range+0x10c/0x1c0 (?:?)
__asan_memcpy+0x27/0x70 (?:?)
snd_seq_event_dup+0x9/0x470 (?:?)
snd_seq_client_enqueue_event+0x139/0x240 (?:?)
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4b/0x60 (?:?)
snd_seq_kernel_client_enqueue+0x102/0x120 (?:?)
snd_seq_oss_write+0x416/0x4e0 (?:?)
apparmor_file_permission+0x20/0x30 (?:?)
odev_write+0x3b/0x60 (?:?)
vfs_write+0x1ce/0x850 (?:?)
lock_release+0xc8/0x2a0 (?:?)
__kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 (?:?)
__mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x129/0x510 (?:?)
ksys_write+0xe1/0x180 (?:?)
mutex_unlock+0x16/0x20 (?:?)
odev_ioctl+0x65/0xc0 (?:?)
__x64_sys_write+0x46/0x60 (?:?)
x64_sys_call+0x7d/0x20d0 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: Fix endpoint/socket association handling
Disassociating a socket from an endpoint via siw_socket_disassoc() may
release the last reference on that endpoint and free it. Therefore, don't
clear the endpoints socket pointer after calling that function, but
within.
This fixes a:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in siw_cm_work_handler (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_cm.c:1053 drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_cm.c:1075)
which occurred after processing a malformed MPA request during connection
establishment, causing the new endpoint to be closed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix deadlock cloning inline extent when using flushoncommit
In commit b48c980b6a7e ("btrfs: fix deadlock between reflink and
transaction commit when using flushoncommit") a deadlock was fixed
between reflinks and transaction commits when the fs is mounted with the
flushoncommit option. This happened when we had to copy an inline extent's
data to the destination file. However the issue was fixed only for the
case where the destination offset is 0, it missed the case when the offset
is greater than zero.
Fix this by ensuring we get i_size update whenever we copied an inline
extent's data into the destination file.
Syzbot reported this with the following trace:
INFO: task kworker/u8:3:57 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u8:3 state:D stack:21600 pid:57 tgid:57 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208160 flags:0x00080000
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-129)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5402 [inline]
__schedule+0x16f9/0x5500 kernel/sched/core.c:7204
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:7283 [inline]
schedule+0x164/0x360 kernel/sched/core.c:7298
wait_extent_bit fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:905 [inline]
btrfs_lock_extent_bits+0x59c/0x700 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:2008
btrfs_lock_extent fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.h:152 [inline]
btrfs_invalidate_folio+0x440/0xc00 fs/btrfs/inode.c:7718
extent_writepage fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1848 [inline]
extent_write_cache_pages fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2552 [inline]
btrfs_writepages+0x12f3/0x2410 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2684
do_writepages+0x32e/0x550 mm/page-writeback.c:2571
__writeback_single_inode+0x133/0x10e0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1764
writeback_sb_inodes+0x97f/0x1980 fs/fs-writeback.c:2056
wb_writeback+0x445/0xb00 fs/fs-writeback.c:2241
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2388 [inline]
wb_workfn+0x3fd/0xf20 fs/fs-writeback.c:2428
process_one_work+0x98b/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:3318
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3401 [inline]
worker_thread+0xb49/0x1140 kernel/workqueue.c:3482
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
INFO: task syz.0.145:8523 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz.0.145 state:D stack:22752 pid:8523 tgid:8522 ppid:5850 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00080002
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5402 [inline]
__schedule+0x16f9/0x5500 kernel/sched/core.c:7204
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:7283 [inline]
schedule+0x164/0x360 kernel/sched/core.c:7298
wb_wait_for_completion+0x3e8/0x790 fs/fs-writeback.c:227
__writeback_inodes_sb_nr+0x24c/0x2d0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2847
try_to_writeback_inodes_sb+0x9a/0xc0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2895
btrfs_start_delalloc_flush fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2182 [inline]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x813/0x2fc0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2371
btrfs_sync_file+0xdf4/0x1230 fs/btrfs/file.c:1822
generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2663 [inline]
btrfs_do_write_iter+0x6a9/0x840 fs/btrfs/file.c:1473
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x629/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:688
ksys_write+0x156/0x270 fs/read_write.c:740
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0x560 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f5a0bdece59
RSP: 002b:00007f5a0b446028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5a0c065fa0 RCX: 00007f5a0bdece59
RDX: 000000000000029f RSI: 0000200000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix kernel BUG in ext4_write_inline_data_end
When the data=journal mount option is used, the ext4_journalled_write_end()
function incorrectly calls ext4_write_inline_data_end() without checking
if the EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA flag is still set on the inode.
If a previous attempt to convert the inline data to an extent failed (e.g.
due to ENOSPC), the EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA flag is cleared, but
the EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA flag remains set. In this scenario, the next
call to ext4_write_begin() will not prepare the inline data xattr for
writing, but ext4_journalled_write_end() will incorrectly attempt to write
to it, triggering a BUG_ON(pos + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size) in
ext4_write_inline_data() since i_inline_size was not expanded.
Fix this by ensuring that ext4_journalled_write_end() only calls
ext4_write_inline_data_end() if the EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA flag is
set, mirroring the behavior of ext4_write_end() and ext4_da_write_end(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: validate donor file superblock early in EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT
Reject the EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT ioctl early if the donor file does not
belong to the same superblock as the original file. Currently, this
validation is performed inside ext4_move_extents() by
mext_check_validity(), but only after lock_two_nondirectories() has
already acquired the inode locks. When the donor fd refers to a file
on a different filesystem (e.g., overlayfs), this late validation
creates a circular lock dependency:
CPU0 (overlayfs write) CPU1 (ext4 ioctl)
---- ----
inode_lock(ovl_inode)
mnt_want_write_file(filp)
sb_start_write(ext4_sb) [sb_writers]
backing_file_write_iter()
vfs_iter_write(real_file)
file_start_write(real_file)
sb_start_write(ext4_sb) [blocked by freeze]
lock_two_nondirectories()
inode_lock(ovl_inode) [blocked]
With a concurrent freeze operation holding sb_writers write side, this
forms a deadlock cycle: CPU0 waits for freeze to complete, freeze waits
for CPU1's sb_writers reader to exit, CPU1 waits for CPU0's inode lock.
Since EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT exchanges physical extents between two files,
it fundamentally requires both files to reside on the same ext4
filesystem. Moving the superblock check before any lock acquisition
is both semantically correct and eliminates the circular dependency
by ensuring that cross-filesystem donor fds are rejected before
sb_writers or inode locks are taken. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix UAF in hci_unregister_dev()
hci_unregister_dev() does not disable cmd_timer and ncmd_timer
before the hci_dev structure is freed. If a timeout fires
during device teardown, the callback dereferences freed memory
(including the hdev->reset function pointer), leading to a
use-after-free.
Add disable_delayed_work_sync() calls alongside the existing
disable_work_sync() calls to ensure both timers are fully
quiesced before teardown proceeds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: watchdog: fix refcount tracking races
Blamed commit converted the untracked dev_hold()/dev_put() calls
in the watchdog code to use the tracked dev_hold_track()/dev_put_track()
(which were later renamed/interfaced to netdev_hold() and netdev_put()).
By introducing dev->watchdog_dev_tracker to store the
reference tracking information without adding synchronization
between netdev_watchdog_up() and dev_watchdog(), it enabled the
race condition where this pointer could be overwritten or freed
concurrently, leading to the list corruption crash syzbot reported:
list_del corruption, ffff888114a18c00->next is NULL
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:52 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 91 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026
Workqueue: events_unbound linkwatch_event
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0x22/0x2a lib/list_debug.c:52
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:132 [inline]
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:246 [inline]
list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:341 [inline]
ref_tracker_free+0x1a7/0x6c0 lib/ref_tracker.c:329
netdev_tracker_free include/linux/netdevice.h:4491 [inline]
netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4508 [inline]
netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4504 [inline]
netdev_watchdog_down net/sched/sch_generic.c:600 [inline]
dev_deactivate_many+0x28c/0xfe0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1363
dev_deactivate+0x109/0x1d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1397
linkwatch_do_dev net/core/link_watch.c:184 [inline]
linkwatch_do_dev+0xd3/0x120 net/core/link_watch.c:166
__linkwatch_run_queue+0x3a5/0x810 net/core/link_watch.c:240
linkwatch_event+0x8f/0xc0 net/core/link_watch.c:314
process_one_work+0xa0e/0x1980 kernel/workqueue.c:3314
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3397 [inline]
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3478
kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x69a/0xc80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
This patch has three coordinated parts:
1) Add dev->watchdog_lock and dev->watchdog_ref_held to serialize watchdog operations.
2) Remove netdev_watchdog_up() call from netif_carrier_on():
This ensures netdev_watchdog_up() is only called from process/BH context
(via linkwatch workqueue dev_activate()), allowing us to use
spin_lock_bh() for synchronization.
3) Synchronize watchdog up and watchdog timer:
Protect netdev_watchdog_up() with tx_global_lock and watchdog_lock.
Only allocate a new tracker in netdev_watchdog_up() if one is
not already present.
In dev_watchdog(), ensure we don't release the tracker if the
timer was rescheduled either by dev_watchdog() itself or concurrently
by netdev_watchdog_up(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfs: use nfsi->rwsem to protect traversal of the file lock list
Lingfeng identified a bug and suggested two solutions, but both appear
to have issues.
Generally, we cannot release flc_lock while iterating over the file lock
list to avoid use-after-free (UAF) problems with file locks. However,
functions like nfs_delegation_claim_locks and nfs4_reclaim_locks cannot
adhere to this rule because recover_lock or nfs4_lock_delegation_recall
may take a long time. To resolve this, NFS switches to using nfsi->rwsem
for the same protection, and nfs_reclaim_locks follows this approach.
Although nfs_delegation_claim_locks uses so_delegreturn_mutex instead,
this is inadequate since a single inode can have multiple nfs4_state
instances. Therefore, the fix is to also use nfsi->rwsem in this case.
Furthermore, after commit c69899a17ca4 ("NFSv4: Update of VFS byte range
lock must be atomic with the stateid update"), the functions
nfs4_locku_done and nfs4_lock_done also break this rule because they
call locks_lock_inode_wait without holding nfsi->rwsem. Simply adding
this protection could cause many deadlocks, so instead, the call to
locks_lock_inode_wait is moved into _nfs4_proc_setlk. Regarding the bug
fixed by commit c69899a17ca4 ("NFSv4: Update of VFS byte range
lock must be atomic with the stateid update"), it has been resolved
after commit 0460253913e5 ("NFSv4: nfs4_do_open() is incorrectly triggering
state recovery") because all slots are drained before calling
nfs4_do_reclaim, which prevents concurrent stateid changes along this path.
Also, nfs_delegation_claim_locks does not cause this concurrency either
since when _nfs4_proc_setlk is called with NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, no RPC is
sent, so nfs4_lock_done is not called. Therefore,
nfs4_lock_delegation_recall from nfs_delegation_claim_locks is the first
time the stateid is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches
KCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request()
on sh->dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op)..
and .. one possible scenario is:
CPU1 CPU2
break_stripe_batch_list(sh1)
-> handle sh2
-> lock(sh2)
-> sh2->batch_head = NULL
-> unlock(sh2)
-> test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2->dev[i].flags)
-> wake_up_bit(sh2->dev[i].flags)
raid5_make_request()
-> add_all_stripe_bios(sh2)
-> lock(sh2)
-> stripe_bio_overlaps(sh2) returns true
batch_head is NULL, so new bio overlap
exist bio on sh2 -> true
-> set_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2->dev[i].flags)
-> unlock(sh2)
-> wait_on_bit(sh2->dev[i].flags)
-> sh2->dev[i].flags = sh1->dev[i].flags & ~R5_Overlap
No wait_up_bit(), CPU2 could be wait_on_bit() forever...
Fix by :
- Expand the protect zone.
- Use batch_head's device flag's snaphot when no held head_sh->stripe_lock.
- Move sh/head_sh->batch_head = NULL to the end of protected zone , and ,
any concurrent add_all_stripe_bios() grabs sh->stripe_lock now either:
- see batch_head != null, and , is rejected by stripe_bio_overlaps()
under the lock (no R5_Overlap wait ) , or ,
- sees batch_head == NULL, only after dev[i].flags has already been
set and the prior R5_Overlap waiters worken.
KCSAN report:
================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in break_stripe_batch_list / raid5_make_request
write (marked) to 0xffff8e89c8117548 of 8 bytes by task 4042 on cpu 0:
raid5_make_request+0xea0/0x2930
md_handle_request+0x4a2/0xa40
md_submit_bio+0x109/0x1a0
__submit_bio+0x2ec/0x390
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x457/0x710
submit_bio_noacct+0x2a7/0xc20
submit_bio+0x56/0x250
blkdev_direct_IO+0x54c/0xda0
blkdev_write_iter+0x38f/0x570
aio_write+0x22b/0x490
io_submit_one+0xa51/0xf70
__x64_sys_io_submit+0xf7/0x220
x64_sys_call+0x1907/0x1c60
do_syscall_64+0x130/0x570
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
read to 0xffff8e89c8117548 of 8 bytes by task 4010 on cpu 5:
break_stripe_batch_list+0x249/0x480
handle_stripe_clean_event+0x720/0x9b0
handle_stripe+0x32fb/0x4500
handle_active_stripes.isra.0+0x6e0/0xa50
raid5d+0x7e0/0xba0
md_thread+0x15a/0x2d0
kthread+0x1e3/0x220
ret_from_fork+0x37a/0x410
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
value changed: 0x0000000000000019 -> 0x0000000000000099 --> R5_Overlap |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix UAF in cleanup_bearer() due to premature dst_cache_destroy()
TIPC UDP media bearer teardown calls dst_cache_destroy() on its
replicast caches before calling synchronize_net() to wait for
concurrent RCU readers (transmitters) to finish:
static void cleanup_bearer(struct work_struct *work)
{
...
list_for_each_entry_safe(rcast, tmp, &ub->rcast.list, list) {
dst_cache_destroy(&rcast->dst_cache);
list_del_rcu(&rcast->list);
kfree_rcu(rcast, rcu);
}
...
dst_cache_destroy(&ub->rcast.dst_cache);
udp_tunnel_sock_release(ub->sk);
synchronize_net();
...
}
This is highly buggy because dst_cache_destroy() immediately frees the
per-CPU cache memory (free_percpu()) and releases the cached dst
entries without any synchronization.
If a concurrent transmitter (e.g., tipc_udp_xmit()) is running on another
CPU under RCU protection, it can call dst_cache_get() concurrently,
leading to:
1. Use-After-Free on the per-CPU cache pointer itself (crash).
2. "rcuref - imbalanced put()" warning if it attempts to release a
dst that was concurrently released by dst_cache_destroy().
Furthermore, calling kfree(ub) immediately after synchronize_net() without
closing the socket first (or waiting after closing it) leaves a window
where a concurrent receiver (tipc_udp_recv()) could start after
synchronize_net(), access ub, and suffer a UAF when kfree(ub) runs.
To fix this, we must defer dst_cache_destroy() and kfree(ub) until after
we have ensured that no more readers can see the bearer/socket and all
existing readers have finished:
1. Defer rcast entry destruction (both dst_cache_destroy() and kfree())
to an RCU callback using call_rcu_hurry().
Using call_rcu_hurry() ensures the dst entries are released quickly.
2. Release the bearer socket using udp_tunnel_sock_release() (stops
new receive readers).
3. Call synchronize_net() to wait for all outstanding RCU readers
(both transmit and receive) to finish.
4. Now that it is safe, call dst_cache_destroy() on the main bearer
cache, and free ub.
Note: 3) and 4) can be changed later in net-next to also use
call_rcu_hurry() and get rid of the synchronize_net() latency. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: 6lowpan: avoid untracked enable work
lowpan_enable_set() allocates a temporary work item and schedules
do_enable_set() on system_wq, then returns to debugfs. The debugfs active
operation has ended at that point, but the worker still executes module
text and manipulates enable_6lowpan and listen_chan.
bt_6lowpan_exit() removes the debugfs files and immediately closes and
puts listen_chan. It has no pointer to the queued work item, so it cannot
cancel or flush it before tearing down the state that the worker uses.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
debugfs enable write module exit
1. lowpan_enable_set() allocates 1. bt_6lowpan_exit() removes
set_enable work the debugfs file
2. schedule_work() queues 2. bt_6lowpan_exit() closes
do_enable_set() and puts listen_chan
3. the write operation returns 3. module teardown can continue
4. do_enable_set() later runs
against stale state
Run the enable state transition synchronously in lowpan_enable_set()
instead. The simple debugfs setter can sleep, and this file already handles
the 6LoWPAN control write synchronously under the same set_lock. Once the
setter returns, debugfs removal covers the whole operation and exit can no
longer race with an untracked work item.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_enable_set+0x113/0x2e0
Workqueue: events do_enable_set [bluetooth_6lowpan]
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888109cb8000 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: 6lowpan: hold L2CAP conn across debugfs control
get_l2cap_conn() looks up an LE hci_conn under hdev protection, but
then drops that protection before reading hcon->l2cap_data and before
lowpan_control_write() later dereferences conn->hcon. A disconnect or
device close can tear down the same L2CAP connection in that window.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
6LoWPAN control write: HCI disconnect/device close:
1. get_l2cap_conn() finds hcon 1. hci_disconn_cfm() dispatches
and hcon->l2cap_data. the L2CAP disconnect callback.
2. get_l2cap_conn() drops hdev 2. l2cap_conn_del() clears
protection and returns conn. hcon->l2cap_data and drops the
L2CAP connection reference.
3. lowpan_control_write() reads 3. hci_conn_del() removes and drops
conn->hcon. the HCI connection.
Take a reference to the L2CAP connection with
l2cap_conn_hold_unless_zero() while hdev is still locked, and drop that
reference after the debugfs command's last use of conn. This mirrors the
existing L2CAP ACL receive-side handoff and keeps the connection
dereferenceable after leaving hdev protection. Export the existing helper
so the bluetooth_6lowpan module can use the same lifetime primitive.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lowpan_control_write+0x374/0x520
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111b9d000 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region
[ffff888111b9d000, ffff888111b9d400)
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x5f0
lowpan_control_write+0x374/0x520 (net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c:1131)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
__virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
__debugfs_file_get+0xf7/0x400
full_proxy_write+0x9e/0xd0
vfs_write+0x1b0/0x810
ksys_write+0xd2/0x170
dnotify_flush+0x32/0x220
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Allocated by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
l2cap_conn_add+0x45/0x520
l2cap_chan_connect+0xac6/0xd90
l2cap_sock_connect+0x216/0x350
__sys_connect+0x101/0x130
__x64_sys_connect+0x40/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
kfree+0x313/0x590
hci_conn_hash_flush+0xc0/0x140
hci_dev_close_sync+0x41a/0xb00
hci_dev_close+0x12f/0x160
hci_sock_ioctl+0x157/0x570
sock_do_ioctl+0xf7/0x210
sock_ioctl+0x32f/0x490
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xc7/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa7/0xc0
insert_work+0x32/0x100
__queue_work+0x262/0xa60
queue_work_on+0xad/0xb0
l2cap_connect_cfm+0x4ef/0x670
hci_le_remote_feat_complete_evt+0x247/0x430
hci_event_packet+0x360/0x6f0
hci_rx_work+0x2ae/0x7a0
process_one_work+0x4fd/0xbc0
worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570
kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/liquidio: drop cached VF pci_dev LUT
The PF SR-IOV enable path caches VF pci_dev pointers in
dpiring_to_vfpcidev_lut[] by iterating with pci_get_device(). Those
entries do not own a reference, because the iterator drops the previous
device reference on each step. The cached pointer is then dereferenced
later when handling OCTEON_VF_FLR_REQUEST.
Replace the cached VF mapping with runtime lookup on the mailbox DPI
ring: derive the VF index from q_no, resolve the VF via exported PCI
IOV helpers, validate it with the PF pointer and VF ID, then issue
pcie_flr() and drop the reference with pci_dev_put(). Remove the
unused VF lookup table initialization and cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: skip extent mft records in writeback to prevent deadlock
This patch fixes the ABBA deadlock between extent_lock and extent
mrec_lock triggered by xfstests generic/113, that occurs since the commit
6994acf33bae ("ntfs: use base mft_no when looking up base inode for
extent record").
Path A (inode writeback):
VFS writeback
-> ntfs_write_inode()
-> __ntfs_write_inode()
-> mutex_lock(&ni->extent_lock)
-> mutex_lock(&tni->mrec_lock)
Path B (MFT folio writeback):
VFS writeback of $MFT dirty folios
-> ntfs_mft_writepages()
-> ntfs_write_mft_block()
-> ntfs_may_write_mft_record()
-> holds one extent mrec_lock from a previous iteration
-> tries to acquire another base inode extent_lock
By removing all extent_lock and extent mrec_lock acquisition from the MFT
folio writeback path, the ABBA lock ordering is eliminated:
Path A: __ntfs_write_inode(): extent_lock -> mrec_lock
Path B (removed): ntfs_write_mft_block(): mrec_lock -> extent_lock
Path B is always redundant for extent records because:
1. mark_mft_record_dirty(ext_ni) does NOT dirty the MFT folio.
It only sets NInoDirty(ext_ni) and marks the base VFS inode dirty
via __mark_inode_dirty(I_DIRTY_DATASYNC), which triggers Path A.
Therefore, normal extent modifications never create a situation where
the MFT folio is dirty and Path B is not scheduled.
2. The MFT folio only gets dirtied via ntfs_mft_mark_dirty() inside
ntfs_mft_record_alloc(). But all identified callers in attrib.c
(ntfs_attr_add, ntfs_attr_record_move_away,
ntfs_attr_make_non_resident, ntfs_attr_record_resize) follow through
with mark_mft_record_dirty(), which triggers Path A to write the
complete record.
3. ntfs_evict_big_inode() calls ntfs_commit_inode() before freeing extent
inodes, ensuring all dirty extents are flushed via Path A before the
base inode leaves the icache. |
