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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-97908 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btqcomsmd: destroy RPMsg endpoints before freeing hci_dev The command and ACL RPMsg endpoints store struct btqcomsmd as their callback private data. The receive callbacks dereference btq->hdev without taking an hci_dev reference. The current teardown order frees the hci_dev before destroying the RPMsg endpoints in both the hci_register_dev() error path and the driver remove path. If WCNSS delivers data in that window, the endpoint callback can run with an already freed hci_dev and pass it to the Bluetooth core. For qcom_smd endpoints, rpmsg_destroy_ept() closes the channel and clears the callback under the channel recv_lock. The receive path holds the same lock while invoking the callback, so destroying the endpoints first both prevents new callbacks and serializes with any callback already running. Destroy the command and ACL endpoints before hci_free_dev(). Keep hci_unregister_dev() first during remove so the HCI core stops issuing operations before the transport endpoints are shut down. In the full registration-error cleanup path, return directly after freeing the hci_dev to avoid falling through to the partial-construction labels and destroying the endpoints twice. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97901 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: genetlink: pin family module during policy dump The generic netlink controller's policy dump keeps pointers to the target family's operation and policy tables in its callback state. A dump may be split across multiple skbs and remain pending after the initial request. Netlink pins the module which owns the dump callback, but in this case that is the controller's owner rather than the target family's owner. The target family can consequently be unregistered and its module unloaded while a policy dump is pending. Advancing the dump then dereferences policy memory from the unloaded module. Take a reference to the target family's module when the dump starts. Drop it from the error and done paths. This matches the lifetime for which the dump context retains the family and policy pointers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97609 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: cttimeout: prevent UAF during module unload nf_ct_set_timeout() protects the timeout hook dereference and policy lookup with rcu_read_lock(). cttimeout_exit(), however, unregisters the per-net operations before it clears the hook. This allows the following interleaving: CPU 0 CPU 1 cttimeout_exit() nf_ct_set_timeout() unregister_pernet_subsys() rcu_read_lock() kfree(pernet) h = nf_ct_timeout_hook h->timeout_find_get() nfct_timeout_pernet() The hook still points to ctnl_timeout_find_get() when CPU 1 looks up the already freed per-net timeout list. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ctnl_timeout_find_get Read of size 8 by task poc/90 Call Trace: ctnl_timeout_find_get+0x271/0x2a0 [nfnetlink_cttimeout] nf_ct_set_timeout+0x7b/0x3c0 xt_ct_tg_check+0x724/0xb20 xt_check_target+0x234/0xa90 do_ipt_set_ctl+0x570/0x1270 Allocated by task 89: __kmalloc_noprof+0x16e/0x460 ops_init+0x6d/0x420 register_pernet_operations+0x2f6/0x670 Freed by task 91: kfree+0x131/0x390 ops_undo_list+0x3d4/0x730 unregister_pernet_operations+0x232/0x490 unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30 cttimeout_exit+0x52/0x970 [nfnetlink_cttimeout] Clear the hook and wait for existing readers before unregistering the per-net operations. This blocks new policy lookups and ensures readers that observed the hook finish before the per-net storage is freed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97594 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: landlock: Fix use-after-free of the source's parent directory current_check_refer_path() reads old_dentry->d_parent without holding a reference nor a lock on it, and then dereferences it in collect_domain_accesses() and in the audit record. A reference on a child does not pin its parent: __d_move() reassigns dentry->d_parent and drops the reference the child held on its former parent. hook_path_rename() is not affected because the rename path calls lock_rename() before the hook, so the source cannot be reparented under it. hook_path_link() has no such protection: filename_linkat() holds a reference on the source dentry but neither locks nor references its parent, so a concurrent rename(2) can reparent the source while security_path_link() runs, and the former parent can then be removed and freed while the hook walks it. A process can trigger this after entering a Landlock domain that handles at least one filesystem access right. The process can then race a linkat(2) loop against rename(2) and rmdir(2): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in collect_domain_accesses+0x278/0x290 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888160bd53f4 by task llrepro2/549 collect_domain_accesses+0x278/0x290 current_check_refer_path+0x952/0x1120 security_path_link+0x1be/0x320 filename_linkat+0x342/0x6d0 __x64_sys_linkat+0xfa/0x150 Freed by task 562: kmem_cache_free+0x139/0x4c0 i_callback+0x4b/0x80 rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0 Take a reference on the dentry selected as the source parent, using dget() for the common-mount-root case and dget_parent() otherwise. Release it after the hierarchy walk and synchronous audit logging. [mic: Clarify the caller, reachability, and reference handling] | ||||
| CVE-2026-97582 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (gpio-fan) Fix use-after-free in alarm work fan_alarm_irq_handler() queues fan_data->alarm_work, but nothing cancels it. fan_alarm_notify() dereferences fan_data and its hwmon device. On unbind, devres frees the interrupt, which only waits for the handler itself, and then releases the hwmon device and fan_data, so a pending fan_alarm_notify() can run after those frees. Replace INIT_WORK() with devm_work_autocancel(), registered before devm_request_irq(). The devres cleanup then frees the interrupt first, so no new work can be queued, and cancels the work while fan_data and the hwmon device are still alive. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97536 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Fix use-after-free of qpair work on queue teardown The response queue MSI-X handler qla2xxx_msix_rsp_q() schedules qla_do_work() via queue_work(ha->wq, &qpair->q_work). qla_do_work() dereferences the qpair (vha, rsp) and takes qpair->qp_lock. During teardown, qla2xxx_delete_qpair() deletes the response queue, which calls free_irq() in qla25xx_free_rsp_que(), and then frees the queue and the qpair. free_irq() waits for running hardirq handlers but does not cancel work already placed on ha->wq. A still-pending q_work then runs qla_do_work() against the freed qpair and response queue, causing a use-after-free. This is especially likely during full adapter teardown, where destroy_workqueue(ha->wq) forces pending work to run after the queue pairs have been freed. Flush the work item with cancel_work_sync() in qla25xx_free_rsp_que() after free_irq() has released the interrupt (so no new work can be queued) and before the response queue and qpair memory are freed (so the flushed handler still sees valid memory). Guard on rsp->qpair and ha->wq to match the INIT_WORK() condition and avoid operating on an uninitialized work_struct. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97531 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Skip vport under deletion in report ID acquisition qla24xx_report_id_acquisition() format-1 handling walks ha->vp_list under vport_slock, takes a vref_count on the matching vport and calls qla_update_host_map() to register its port id. A vport teardown via qla24xx_vport_delete() sets VPORT_DELETE, then qla24xx_disable_vp() removes the vport from the host_map btree and zeroes vha->d_id (RESET_AL_PA). The vport is only unlinked from vp_list later, in qla24xx_deallocate_vp_id(), which clears vp_map[idx] (RESET_VP_IDX) but does not touch host_map. In the window in between, report ID acquisition can still find the vport on vp_list and call qla_update_host_map(); with d_id already zeroed it takes the btree_insert32() path and re-inserts the dying vport into host_map. Nothing cleans that entry afterwards, so once scsi_host_put() frees the vha a later host_map lookup dereferences freed memory. Skip a vport that has VPORT_DELETE set before taking the reference, so it is neither re-registered nor scheduled for DPC re-registration. This mirrors the existing guard in qla2x00_alert_all_vps(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-97478 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virt: acrn: Fix irqfd use-after-free during eventfd shutdown acrn_irqfd_deassign() and the eventfd EPOLLHUP wakeup can race and free the same struct hsm_irqfd: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- eventfd_release() wake_up_poll(EPOLLHUP) hsm_irqfd_wakeup() queue_work(&irqfd->shutdown) acrn_irqfd_deassign() hsm_irqfd_shutdown() list_del_init() eventfd_ctx_remove_wait_queue() eventfd_ctx_put() kfree(irqfd) hsm_irqfd_shutdown_work() container_of(work, ..., shutdown) irqfd->vm <-- use-after-free The deassign path freed the irqfd while a shutdown work item was already queued by EPOLLHUP (or vice versa), so the work item could resurrect a dangling pointer through container_of(). Switch to the lifetime model used by KVM irqfds: - Deassign/deinit only deactivate the irqfd: remove it from vm->irqfds under irqfds_lock and queue the cleanup work. - hsm_irqfd_shutdown_work() becomes the sole owner that unhooks the eventfd waitqueue entry, drops the eventfd reference and frees the irqfd. - A new HSM_IRQFD_FLAG_SHUTDOWN bit guarded by test_and_set_bit() ensures the cleanup work is queued at most once, no matter how many of {EPOLLHUP, deassign, deinit} fire concurrently. This is safe to call from the waitqueue callback, which runs with wqh->lock held and IRQs disabled and therefore cannot take irqfds_lock. - acrn_irqfd_deassign() flushes vm->irqfd_wq before returning so the eventfd is fully detached on return. acrn_irqfd_deinit() deactivates every irqfd, flushes the workqueue and only then destroys it, so no path can queue_work() onto a torn-down workqueue. - acrn_irqfd_assign() now installs the eventfd waitqueue entry and publishes the irqfd to vm->irqfds under irqfds_lock, so the irqfd is never visible to deassign/deinit before its waitqueue entry is in place, and any EPOLLHUP that fires in the assign window queues cleanup work that blocks on irqfds_lock until publication is done. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93817 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix addr_filter_ranges lifetime Lee Jia Jie reported that since event::addr_filter_ranges is used under RCU, it should be RCU freed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93796 | 1 Linux | 2 Kernel, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: pcie: null RX pointers after free When iwl_pcie_tx_init() fails after RX init, nic init unwinds via iwl_pcie_rx_free(). The freed RX members stayed non-NULL on the live transport object, so later teardown or retry could touch stale RX state. Set rx_pool, global_table, rxq, and alloc_page to NULL after free to make repeated cleanup and retry paths safe. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93794 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: flush dirty data before punching a hole Punching a hole after a large buffered write may leave the range reported as data. Reproduce it with: xfs_io -f \ -c "pwrite -b 3m -S 0x61 0 3m" \ -c "fpunch 1m 1m" \ -c "seek -h 0" \ -c "seek -d 1m" \ /mnt/test/repro Punching 1 MiB at offset 1 MiB should produce: 0 1 MiB 2 MiB 3 MiB | DATA | HOLE | DATA | EOF Instead, the entire file is reported as data. SEEK_HOLE(0) returns EOF, and SEEK_DATA(1M) returns 1M. This happens because a dirty folio spanning the punched range can be written back after the punch and refill the hole. Fix this by flushing and waiting for dirty data in the punched range before invalidating the page cache and issuing FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA. The xfstests generic/539 pass against Samba/ksmbd with this change. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93208 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kasan: fix cache shrink race with CPU hotplug kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() first invokes per_cpu_remove_cache() on all online CPUs. Each callback moves objects belonging to the cache from cpu_quarantine to the CPU's shrink_qlist, where they can later be freed from task context. kmem_cache_destroy() invokes the quarantine removal path while holding cpus_read_lock(), but kmem_cache_shrink() does not. The latter can therefore race with CPU offlining as follows: kmem_cache_shrink() CPU hotplug ------------------- ----------- on_each_cpu() CPU1 moves objects to CPU1's shrink_qlist on_each_cpu() returns CPU1 goes offline kasan_cpu_offline() drains cpu_quarantine leaves shrink_qlist untouched for_each_online_cpu() skips CPU1 The objects left on CPU1's shrink_qlist are not returned to the slab allocator. This may prevent kmem_cache_shrink() from releasing slabs that would otherwise become empty. If CPU1 remains offline, a later kmem_cache_destroy() also skips the list and can report that the cache still contains objects. An intermittent occurrence was observed with a virtio-9p filesystem. The mount and umount commands both returned 0, but the kernel logged the following during the userspace-triggered teardown: [ 2994.380134][ T111] BUG 9p-fcall-cache-1 (Tainted: G B ): Objects remaining on __kmem_cache_shutdown() [ 2994.381140][ T111] Object 0xff11000004361118 @offset=4376 [ 2994.381607][ T111] Allocated in p9_fcall_init+0x201/0x400 age=19564 cpu=1 pid=104 [ 2994.382591][ T111] p9_fcall_init+0x201/0x400 [ 2994.382810][ T111] p9_tag_alloc+0x12f/0x700 [ 2994.382982][ T111] p9_client_prepare_req+0x102/0x3e0 [ 2994.383165][ T111] p9_client_rpc+0x1ab/0xa50 [ 2994.383334][ T111] p9_client_getattr_dotl+0xb0/0x1a0 [ 2994.383515][ T111] v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl+0x115/0x360 [ 2994.383719][ T111] vfs_getattr_nosec+0x22c/0x3a0 [ 2994.383910][ T111] vfs_statx+0xd7/0x170 [ 2994.384062][ T111] vfs_fstatat+0x45/0x80 [ 2994.384215][ T111] __do_sys_newfstatat+0x84/0xe0 [ 2994.384386][ T111] do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 [ 2994.384566][ T111] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 2994.399720][ T111] WARNING: mm/slub.c:1244 at __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x363/0x500, CPU#0: busybox/111 [ 2994.405655][ T111] Call Trace: [ 2994.406325][ T111] kmem_cache_destroy+0x73/0x1b0 [ 2994.406630][ T111] p9_client_destroy+0x271/0x3c0 [ 2994.407210][ T111] v9fs_session_close+0x3c/0x260 [ 2994.407409][ T111] v9fs_kill_super+0x48/0x90 [ 2994.407584][ T111] deactivate_locked_super+0xa3/0x160 [ 2994.407778][ T111] cleanup_mnt+0x1dd/0x3e0 Thus, a successful umount left objects in the 9p fcall cache and prevented the cache from being destroyed cleanly. Per-CPU shrink_qlist storage exists for every possible CPU, and each list is protected by its own raw spinlock. Iterate over possible CPUs so that a list populated before its CPU went offline is drained as well. for_each_possible_cpu() can do more work than for_each_online_cpu(), but this change only affects CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC kernels. The extra work is limited to cache shrink and cache destruction paths and does not affect the normal allocation/free fast path. It adds one raw-spinlock-protected scan of each possible CPU's shrink list. These lists are normally empty; a non-empty list is traversed to remove objects belonging to the cache being shrunk or destroyed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90105 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: fix reading neigh ha Currently arp/neigh_reduce read neigh ha directly which can lead to partial reads while the neigh is being updated. Use neigh_ha_snapshot to take a stable snapshot of the address similar to route_shortcircuit which already does the right thing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90021 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_midi: initialize work in f_midi_alloc() f_midi_alloc initializes free_ref to 1 and it can only be incremented when a sound card is registered via f_midi_register_card(). f_midi_register_card() is only called in f_midi_bind() which actually performs INIT_WORK. If f_midi_bind() is never run, work is not initialized and the if condition in f_midi_free becomes true, this results in a warning later in __flush_work as work->func = 0. Fix this by moving INIT_WORK from f_midi_bind() to f_midi_alloc(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89763 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup() holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the synchronization point that must precede backend teardown. The current order permits this interleaving: CPU 0 CPU 1 trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted") put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal() kfree(digests) pcrlock() unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests) CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can also be released before callbacks stop using it. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89 Call Trace: tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted] trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted] trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted] __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0 __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50 __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310 Allocated by task 88: __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490 do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390 do_init_module+0x2df/0x840 Freed by task 90: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted] __do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510 Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the backend state is destroyed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89762 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section() AppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function called from lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checks if the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and if so, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with an updated version that uses a new label. The first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF of `struct cred` if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the current creds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replaces creds, like so: ``` const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); alloc_file_pseudo(...); uid_t uid = cred->euid; ``` I don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think it is very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF. The second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label() runs with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out if `current_cred() != current_real_cred()` (mirroring the check in proc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detect overridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as the objective creds. So in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong: 1. task begins with <creds A> (as both objective and subjective creds), with refcount=2 2. task grabs an extra reference on <creds A> for overriding 3. task calls override_creds(<creds A>), which returns a pointer to the old subjective creds (<creds A>) 4. task enters AppArmor LSM hook 5. AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal 6. AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with <creds B> and drops 2 refs on <creds A> 7. task leaves AppArmor LSM hook 8. task calls revert_creds(<creds A>) 9. now task->cred is <creds A> while task->real_cred is <creds B>, but the task_struct logically holds two references to <creds B> 10. another task drops the extra reference on <creds A> that was used for overriding, refcount drops to 0 11. now task->real_cred points to freed creds At this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF. I have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a process using that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file into a full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice() resumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscall results in a KASAN UAF splat. To fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work that will run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which the cred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just a performance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount of the new label.) Note that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in the sb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacements can still happen in VFS ->write() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write(). There are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Either explicitly reset new->label_replacement_pending after the entire aa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over. I am switching to manually copying members over because that should make bugs more obvious. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89740 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 6.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: serial: imx: serialize imx_uart_ports[] lifetime imx_uart_probe() publishes its devm-allocated port in imx_uart_ports[] before uart_add_one_port() because console setup uses the table. The entry is not cleared when adding the port fails or after removal, leaving a dangling pointer. A sibling probe can register the shared console through that stale entry. This was reproduced under KASAN on QEMU mcimx6ul-evk by unbinding a sibling UART, unbinding the console UART and rebinding the sibling. Keep the entry valid through uart_remove_one_port(), then clear it. Protect port addition and removal together with their table updates so sibling operations cannot interleave. Reject an occupied slot rather than clobbering an active port during a duplicate-line probe. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89738 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: at91_udc: drain polled-VBUS timer/work before udc is freed In polled-VBUS mode (board.vbus_pin && board.vbus_polled), probe arms a self-restarting cycle: at91_vbus_timer() schedules vbus_timer_work, and at91_vbus_timer_work() calls at91_vbus_update() and re-arms the timer via mod_timer(). Both recover the same udc through container_of and dereference it on every iteration. Neither teardown path cancels this cycle. udc is devm-allocated, so it is freed after at91udc_remove() returns, and is likewise freed when probe fails and devres runs. A timer callback or work item that is pending or running at either point dereferences the freed udc. Add at91_udc_shutdown_vbus_timer() and call it from at91udc_remove() and from the usb_add_gadget_udc() failure path in probe; the remaining probe error paths fail before the timer is armed. timer_shutdown_sync() waits for a running callback and clears timer->function, which makes the work handler's mod_timer() a permanent no-op; cancel_work_sync() then drains any pending or running work whose re-arm attempt now does nothing. The timer must be shut down first, since cancelling the work alone would let the timer re-queue it. The guard mirrors probe: in IRQ mode the timer and work_struct are never initialized. This does not require a fault; a normal driver unbind can interleave with an already queued work item. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89682 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix fcache_disposal UAF by inlining dispose state into nfsd_net nfsd_file_dispose_list_delayed() defers fput() to nfsd service threads via a per-net freeme queue, preventing the shrinker and GC worker from bearing the cost of closing files (see ffb402596147). However, the queue lives in a separately-allocated struct nfsd_fcache_disposal that is freed by nfsd_free_fcache_disposal_net() during per-net teardown. The global shrinker, laundrette, and fsnotify callbacks can still be inside nfsd_file_dispose_list_delayed() dereferencing that pointer, causing a use-after-free. Inline the spinlock and freeme list directly into struct nfsd_net (as fcache_dispose_lock and fcache_dispose_list), eliminating the separately allocated struct nfsd_fcache_disposal entirely. These fields now have the same lifetime as the net namespace itself, so there is no dangling pointer to chase. nfsd_file_cache_start_net() now just initializes the inline fields and cannot fail due to allocation. nfsd_file_cache_shutdown_net() drains the inline list directly instead of freeing a separate struct. The alloc/free helpers are removed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89676 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix stale s2s_cp_stateids IDR entry for async COPY For an async COPY, nfsd4_copy() called nfs4_init_copy_state() before dup_copy_fields(), so the s2s_cp_stateids IDR was pointed at &u->copy->cp_stateid -- memory in the per-rqstp COMPOUND buffer that is reused by the next request. dup_copy_fields() copies only the value into async_copy, so the IDR slot dangled at the transient buffer for the whole background copy. Any IDR walker then dereferences reused request memory: the laundromat reads cs_type from it and, if the bytes look like an expired NFS4_COPYNOTIFY_STID, follows into refcount_dec()/idr_remove()/kfree() on garbage; manage_cpntf_state() has the same exposure via idr_find(). Duplicate the fields first, then register the stateid on the stable async_copy. result->cb_stateid is unchanged. | ||||