| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| HTTP::Body versions before 1.23_01 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via an unbounded multipart part header block.
The multipart parser takes everything up to the first blank line after a boundary as the part's header block, with no limit on its size or number of lines. Every line is stored in the part's header hash, so a block of short lines costs about 60 bytes of memory per input byte.
A remote attacker can exhaust worker memory with a single request. |
| The Redux Framework plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via 'multi_media' Field Array Key in all versions due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The wp_kses_post sanitization applied at save time operates only on array leaf values, leaving array keys entirely unsanitized; the injected key is then rendered directly into an id="filelist-<KEY>" HTML attribute without esc_attr() in Redux_Multi_Media::render(), allowing attribute breakout. |
| MariaDB server is a community developed fork of MySQL server. From 10.11.1 until 10.11.19, 11.4.13, 11.8.9, 12.3.3, and 13.0.2, ALTER TABLE ... CONVERT ... PARTITION does not apply filename encoding to user-specified partition names before using them in filesystem path construction. An authenticated database user can use a partition name requiring filename escaping to make the conversion operate on table files the user is not authorized to access, allowing unauthorized table reads or modifications. This issue is fixed in versions 10.11.19, 11.4.13, 11.8.9, 12.3.3, and 13.0.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: convert control queue mutex to a spinlock
With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated
on module load:
[ 324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578
[ 324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager
[ 324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
[ 324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
[ 324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582:
[ 324.701702] #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0
[ 324.701730] #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870
[ 324.701749] Preemption disabled at:
[ 324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870
[ 324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022
[ 324.701774] Call Trace:
[ 324.701777] <TASK>
[ 324.701779] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
[ 324.701788] ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870
[ 324.701793] __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d
<..>
[ 324.701818] __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80
<..>
[ 324.701917] idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf]
[ 324.701935] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 324.701941] idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf]
<..>
[ 324.701991] idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf]
[ 324.702009] idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf]
[ 324.702021] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0
[ 324.702035] idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf]
<..>
[ 324.702122] __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300
[ 324.702126] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
[ 324.702134] idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf]
[ 324.702152] __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870
[ 324.702159] ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10
[ 324.702174] __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650
<..>
[ 324.702208] netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160
[ 324.702218] do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960
<..>
[ 324.702349] rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0
The sequence is as follows:
rtnl_newlink()->
__dev_change_flags()->
__dev_open()->
dev_set_rx_mode() - > # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock"
idpf_set_rx_mode() -> # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON
__dev_uc_sync() ->
idpf_add_mac_filter ->
idpf_add_del_mac_filters ->
idpf_send_mb_msg() ->
idpf_mb_clean() ->
idpf_ctlq_clean_sq() # mutex_lock(cq_lock)
Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new
lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix
by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/sgx: Prevent attempts to reclaim poisoned pages
TL;DR: SGX page reclaim touches the page to copy its contents to
secondary storage. SGX instructions do not gracefully handle machine
checks. Despite this, the existing SGX code will try to reclaim pages
that it _knows_ are poisoned. Avoid even trying to reclaim poisoned pages.
The longer story:
Pages used by an enclave only get epc_page->poison set in
arch_memory_failure() but they currently stay on sgx_active_page_list until
sgx_encl_release(), with the SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED flag untouched.
epc_page->poison is not checked in the reclaimer logic meaning that, if other
conditions are met, an attempt will be made to reclaim an EPC page that was
poisoned. This is bad because 1. we don't want that page to end up added
to another enclave and 2. it is likely to cause one core to shut down
and the kernel to panic.
Specifically, reclaiming uses microcode operations including "EWB" which
accesses the EPC page contents to encrypt and write them out to non-SGX
memory. Those operations cannot handle MCEs in their accesses other than
by putting the executing core into a special shutdown state (affecting
both threads with HT.) The kernel will subsequently panic on the
remaining cores seeing the core didn't enter MCE handler(s) in time.
Call sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable() to remove the affected EPC page from
sgx_active_page_list on memory error to stop it being considered for
reclaiming.
Testing epc_page->poison in sgx_reclaim_pages() would also work but I assume
it's better to add code in the less likely paths.
The affected EPC page is not added to &node->sgx_poison_page_list until
later in sgx_encl_release()->sgx_free_epc_page() when it is EREMOVEd.
Membership on other lists doesn't change to avoid changing any of the
lists' semantics except for sgx_active_page_list. There's a "TBD" comment
in arch_memory_failure() about pre-emptive actions, the goal here is not
to address everything that it may imply.
This also doesn't completely close the time window when a memory error
notification will be fatal (for a not previously poisoned EPC page) --
the MCE can happen after sgx_reclaim_pages() has selected its candidates
or even *inside* a microcode operation (actually easy to trigger due to
the amount of time spent in them.)
The spinlock in sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable() is safe because
memory_failure() runs in process context and no spinlocks are held,
explicitly noted in a mm/memory-failure.c comment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Fix memory leak due to multiple rx_stats allocation
rx_stats for each arsta is allocated when adding a station.
arsta->rx_stats will be freed when a station is removed.
Redundant allocations are occurring when the same station is added
multiple times. This causes ath12k_mac_station_add() to be called
multiple times, and rx_stats is allocated each time. As a result there
is memory leaks.
Prevent multiple allocations of rx_stats when ath12k_mac_station_add()
is called repeatedly by checking if rx_stats is already allocated
before allocating again. Allocate arsta->rx_stats if arsta->rx_stats
is NULL respectively.
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.3.1-00173-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.0.c5-00481-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath9k_htc: Abort software beacon handling if disabled
A malicious USB device can send a WMI_SWBA_EVENTID event from an
ath9k_htc-managed device before beaconing has been enabled. This causes
a device-by-zero error in the driver, leading to either a crash or an
out of bounds read.
Prevent this by aborting the handling in ath9k_htc_swba() if beacons are
not enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: smartpqi: Use is_kdump_kernel() to check for kdump
The smartpqi driver checks the reset_devices variable to determine
whether special adjustments need to be made for kdump. This has the
effect that after a regular kexec reboot, some driver parameters such as
max_transfer_size are much lower than usual. More importantly, kexec
reboot tests have revealed memory corruption caused by the driver log
being written to system memory after a kexec.
Fix this by testing is_kdump_kernel() rather than reset_devices where
appropriate. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: memory-failure: update ttu flag inside unmap_poisoned_folio
Patch series "mm: memory_failure: unmap poisoned folio during migrate
properly", v3.
Fix two bugs during folio migration if the folio is poisoned.
This patch (of 3):
Commit 6da6b1d4a7df ("mm/hwpoison: convert TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON to
TTU_HWPOISON") introduce TTU_HWPOISON to replace TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON in
order to stop send SIGBUS signal when accessing an error page after a
memory error on a clean folio. However during page migration, anon folio
must be set with TTU_HWPOISON during unmap_*(). For pagecache we need
some policy just like the one in hwpoison_user_mappings to set this flag.
So move this policy from hwpoison_user_mappings to unmap_poisoned_folio to
handle this warning properly.
Warning will be produced during unamp poison folio with the following log:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 365 at mm/rmap.c:1847 try_to_unmap_one+0x8fc/0xd3c
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 365 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00018-gacdb4bbda7ab #42
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : try_to_unmap_one+0x8fc/0xd3c
lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c
Call trace:
try_to_unmap_one+0x8fc/0xd3c (P)
try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L)
rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8
rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58
try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90
unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8
do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568
offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670
memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374
memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78
device_offline+0xa4/0xd0
state_store+0x8c/0xf0
dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c
sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8
vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc
ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8
__arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[mawupeng1@huawei.com: unmap_poisoned_folio(): remove shadowed local `mapping', per Miaohe] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/code-patching: Disable KASAN report during patching via temporary mm
Erhard reports the following KASAN hit on Talos II (power9) with kernel 6.13:
[ 12.028126] ==================================================================
[ 12.028198] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0
[ 12.028260] Write of size 8 at addr 0000187e458f2000 by task systemd/1
[ 12.028346] CPU: 87 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G T 6.13.0-P9-dirty #3
[ 12.028408] Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT
[ 12.028446] Hardware name: T2P9D01 REV 1.01 POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-bc106a0 PowerNV
[ 12.028500] Call Trace:
[ 12.028536] [c000000008dbf3b0] [c000000001656a48] dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x110 (unreliable)
[ 12.028609] [c000000008dbf3f0] [c0000000006e2fc8] print_report+0x6b0/0x708
[ 12.028666] [c000000008dbf4e0] [c0000000006e2454] kasan_report+0x164/0x300
[ 12.028725] [c000000008dbf600] [c0000000006e54d4] kasan_check_range+0x314/0x370
[ 12.028784] [c000000008dbf640] [c0000000006e6310] __kasan_check_write+0x20/0x40
[ 12.028842] [c000000008dbf660] [c000000000578e8c] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0
[ 12.028902] [c000000008dbf6a0] [c0000000000acfe4] __patch_instructions+0x194/0x210
[ 12.028965] [c000000008dbf6e0] [c0000000000ade80] patch_instructions+0x150/0x590
[ 12.029026] [c000000008dbf7c0] [c0000000001159bc] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x6c/0xe0
[ 12.029085] [c000000008dbf800] [c000000000424250] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x40/0xc0
[ 12.029147] [c000000008dbf830] [c000000000115dec] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3bc/0x930
[ 12.029206] [c000000008dbf990] [c000000000423720] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x1f0/0x280
[ 12.029266] [c000000008dbfa00] [c000000000434b18] bpf_prog_load+0xbb8/0x1370
[ 12.029324] [c000000008dbfb70] [c000000000436ebc] __sys_bpf+0x5ac/0x2e00
[ 12.029379] [c000000008dbfd00] [c00000000043a228] sys_bpf+0x28/0x40
[ 12.029435] [c000000008dbfd20] [c000000000038eb4] system_call_exception+0x334/0x610
[ 12.029497] [c000000008dbfe50] [c00000000000c270] system_call_vectored_common+0xf0/0x280
[ 12.029561] --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.029608] NIP: 00003fff82f5cfa8 LR: 00003fff82f5cfa8 CTR: 0000000000000000
[ 12.029660] REGS: c000000008dbfe80 TRAP: 3000 Tainted: G T (6.13.0-P9-dirty)
[ 12.029735] MSR: 900000000280f032 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 42004848 XER: 00000000
[ 12.029855] IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000169 00003fffdcf789a0 00003fff83067100 0000000000000005
GPR04: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000090 0000000000000000 0000000000000008
GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR12: 0000000000000000 00003fff836ff7e0 c000000000010678 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f28 00003fffdcf78f90
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f80
GPR24: 00003fffdcf78f70 00003fffdcf78d10 00003fff835c7239 00003fffdcf78bd8
GPR28: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000011f547580
[ 12.030316] NIP [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.030361] LR [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8
[ 12.030405] --- interrupt: 3000
[ 12.030444] ==================================================================
Commit c28c15b6d28a ("powerpc/code-patching: Use temporary mm for
Radix MMU") is inspired from x86 but unlike x86 is doesn't disable
KASAN reports during patching. This wasn't a problem at the begining
because __patch_mem() is not instrumented.
Commit 465cabc97b42 ("powerpc/code-patching: introduce
patch_instructions()") use copy_to_kernel_nofault() to copy several
instructions at once. But when using temporary mm the destination is
not regular kernel memory but a kind of kernel-like memory located
in user address space.
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd/iova_bitmap: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in iova_bitmap_offset_to_index()
Resolve a UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds issue in iova_bitmap_offset_to_index()
where shifting the constant "1" (of type int) by bitmap->mapped.pgshift
(an unsigned long value) could result in undefined behavior.
The constant "1" defaults to a 32-bit "int", and when "pgshift" exceeds
31 (e.g., pgshift = 63) the shift operation overflows, as the result
cannot be represented in a 32-bit type.
To resolve this, the constant is updated to "1UL", promoting it to an
unsigned long type to match the operand's type. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/dp_mst: Fix resetting msg rx state after topology removal
If the MST topology is removed during the reception of an MST down reply
or MST up request sideband message, the
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr::up_req_recv/down_rep_recv states could be reset
from one thread via drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(false), racing with
the reading/parsing of the message from another thread via
drm_dp_mst_handle_down_rep() or drm_dp_mst_handle_up_req(). The race is
possible since the reader/parser doesn't hold any lock while accessing
the reception state. This in turn can lead to a memory corruption in the
reader/parser as described by commit bd2fccac61b4 ("drm/dp_mst: Fix MST
sideband message body length check").
Fix the above by resetting the message reception state if needed before
reading/parsing a message. Another solution would be to hold the
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr::lock for the whole duration of the message
reception/parsing in drm_dp_mst_handle_down_rep() and
drm_dp_mst_handle_up_req(), however this would require a bigger change.
Since the fix is also needed for stable, opting for the simpler solution
in this patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/entry: Mark IRQ entries to fix stack depot warnings
The stack depot filters out everything outside of the top interrupt
context as an uninteresting or irrelevant part of the stack traces. This
helps with stack trace de-duplication, avoiding an explosion of saved
stack traces that share the same IRQ context code path but originate
from different randomly interrupted points, eventually exhausting the
stack depot.
Filtering uses in_irqentry_text() to identify functions within the
.irqentry.text and .softirqentry.text sections, which then become the
last stack trace entries being saved.
While __do_softirq() is placed into the .softirqentry.text section by
common code, populating .irqentry.text is architecture-specific.
Currently, the .irqentry.text section on s390 is empty, which prevents
stack depot filtering and de-duplication and could result in warnings
like:
Stack depot reached limit capacity
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 286113 at lib/stackdepot.c:252 depot_alloc_stack+0x39a/0x3c8
with PREEMPT and KASAN enabled.
Fix this by moving the IO/EXT interrupt handlers from .kprobes.text into
the .irqentry.text section and updating the kprobes blacklist to include
the .irqentry.text section.
This is done only for asynchronous interrupts and explicitly not for
program checks, which are synchronous and where the context beyond the
program check is important to preserve. Despite machine checks being
somewhat in between, they are extremely rare, and preserving context
when possible is also of value.
SVCs and Restart Interrupts are not relevant, one being always at the
boundary to user space and the other being a one-time thing.
IRQ entries filtering is also optionally used in ftrace function graph,
where the same logic applies. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: handle otx2_mbox_get_rsp errors in otx2_dmac_flt.c
Add error pointer checks after calling otx2_mbox_get_rsp(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: pcrypt - Call crypto layer directly when padata_do_parallel() return -EBUSY
Since commit 8f4f68e788c3 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for
PADATA_RESET"), the pcrypt encryption and decryption operations return
-EAGAIN when the CPU goes online or offline. In alg_test(), a WARN is
generated when pcrypt_aead_decrypt() or pcrypt_aead_encrypt() returns
-EAGAIN, the unnecessary panic will occur when panic_on_warn set 1.
Fix this issue by calling crypto layer directly without parallelization
in that case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/tctx: work around xa_store() allocation error issue
syzbot triggered the following WARN_ON:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at io_uring/tctx.c:51 __io_uring_free+0xfa/0x140 io_uring/tctx.c:51
which is the
WARN_ON_ONCE(!xa_empty(&tctx->xa));
sanity check in __io_uring_free() when a io_uring_task is going through
its final put. The syzbot test case includes injecting memory allocation
failures, and it very much looks like xa_store() can fail one of its
memory allocations and end up with ->head being non-NULL even though no
entries exist in the xarray.
Until this issue gets sorted out, work around it by attempting to
iterate entries in our xarray, and WARN_ON_ONCE() if one is found. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Don't retire aborted MMIO instruction
Returning an abort to the guest for an unsupported MMIO access is a
documented feature of the KVM UAPI. Nevertheless, it's clear that this
plumbing has seen limited testing, since userspace can trivially cause a
WARN in the MMIO return:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30558 at arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536 kvm_handle_mmio_return+0x46c/0x5c4 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536
Call trace:
kvm_handle_mmio_return+0x46c/0x5c4 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h:536
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x98/0x15b4 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:1133
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x75c/0xa78 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4487
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:893 [inline]
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x14c/0x1c8 fs/ioctl.c:893
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x1e0/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x38/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
The splat is complaining that KVM is advancing PC while an exception is
pending, i.e. that KVM is retiring the MMIO instruction despite a
pending synchronous external abort. Womp womp.
Fix the glaring UAPI bug by skipping over all the MMIO emulation in
case there is a pending synchronous exception. Note that while userspace
is capable of pending an asynchronous exception (SError, IRQ, or FIQ),
it is still safe to retire the MMIO instruction in this case as (1) they
are by definition asynchronous, and (2) KVM relies on hardware support
for pending/delivering these exceptions instead of the software state
machine for advancing PC. |
| A flaw was found in polkit. A local user can exploit this by providing a specially crafted, excessively long input to the `polkit-agent-helper-1` setuid binary via standard input (stdin). This unbounded input can lead to an out-of-memory (OOM) condition, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa: Add max vqp attr to vdpa_nl_policy for nlattr length check
The vdpa_nl_policy structure is used to validate the nlattr when parsing
the incoming nlmsg. It will ensure the attribute being described produces
a valid nlattr pointer in info->attrs before entering into each handler
in vdpa_nl_ops.
That is to say, the missing part in vdpa_nl_policy may lead to illegal
nlattr after parsing, which could lead to OOB read just like CVE-2023-3773.
This patch adds the missing nla_policy for vdpa max vqp attr to avoid
such bugs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macvlan: add forgotten nla_policy for IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF
The previous commit 954d1fa1ac93 ("macvlan: Add netlink attribute for
broadcast cutoff") added one additional attribute named
IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF to allow broadcast cutfoff.
However, it forgot to describe the nla_policy at macvlan_policy
(drivers/net/macvlan.c). Hence, this suppose NLA_S32 (4 bytes) integer
can be faked as empty (0 bytes) by a malicious user, which could leads
to OOB in heap just like CVE-2023-3773.
To fix it, this commit just completes the nla_policy description for
IFLA_MACVLAN_BC_CUTOFF. This enforces the length check and avoids the
potential OOB read. |
