| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Null pointer dereference in Windows USM Communication Manager allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Secondary Logon allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in HID Parser Library allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges with a physical attack. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in HID Parser Library allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges with a physical attack. |
| Use after free in Winsock allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Use of uninitialized resource in SQL Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_byteorder: remove multi-register support
64bit byteorder conversion is broken when several registers need to be
converted because the source register array advances in steps for 4 bytes
instead of 8:
for (i = ...
src64 = nft_reg_load64(&src[i]);
~~~~~ u32 *src
nft_reg_store64(&dst64[i],
Remove the multi-register support, it has other issues as well:
Pablo points out that commit
caf3ef7468f7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval")
alters semantics: before the loop operated on registers, i.e.
for ( ... )
dst32[i] = htons((u16)src32[i])
.. but after the patch it will operate on bytes, which makes this
useless to convert e.g. concatenations, which store each compound
in its own register.
Multi-convert of u32 has one theoretical application:
ct mark . meta mark . tcp dport @intervalset
Because ct mark and meta mark are host byte order, use with
intervals has to convert the byteorder for ct/meta mark value
to network byte order (bigendian).
nftables emits this:
[ meta load mark => reg 1 ]
[ byteorder reg 1 = hton(reg 1, 4, 4) ]
[ ct load mark => reg 9 ]
[ byteorder reg 9 = hton(reg 9, 4, 4) ]
...
I.e. two separate calls. Theoretically it could be changed to do:
[ meta load mark => reg 1 ]
[ ct load mark => reg 9 ]
[ byteorder reg 1 = htonl(reg 1, 4, 8) ]
...
But then all it would take to change the set to
meta mark . tcp dport . ct mark
... and we'd be back to two "byteorder" calls. IOW, support to
convert a range of registers is both dysfunctional and dubious.
Simplify this: remove the feature.
Pablo Neira Ayuso points out that nftables before 1.1.0 can generate
incorrect byteorder conversions, see 9fe58952c45a,
"evaluate: skip byteorder conversion for selector smaller than 2 bytes"
in nftables.git). Affected rulesets fail to load with this change and
old userspace due to 'len != size' check. |
| IBM SevOne Network Performance Management 7.0.0 through 8.2.2 could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to uncontrolled resource consumption. |
| Incorrect permission assignment for critical resource in Windows Brokering File System allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| CodeChecker's web server fails to fully invalidate a session token on logout when the server runs with more than one API worker process (the default). Each worker process maintains its own
in-memory session cache; logout only clears the cache of the single worker that handles the request (plus the shared database record). Other workers continue to honor the destroyed token
from their stale in-memory copies until the session's lifetime expires. An attacker who has captured a valid token can therefore keep impersonating the user after the user has logged out. |
| SQL Injection in the entity engine's generic performFind service in Apache OFBiz 24.09 before 24.09.08 on MySQL/MariaDB-backed deployments allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to disclose arbitrary rows from the queried entity by submitting an ignore-case find request (e.g. _ic=Y) with a crafted value, causing SqlJdbcUtil.addValueSingle to inline the EntityFunction-wrapped value directly into the SQL text using ANSI-only single-quote doubling instead of binding it as a parameter, which is insufficient on MySQL/MariaDB because those dialects also honor backslash escapes, letting a backslash-terminated payload break out of the string literal and turn the WHERE clause into a tautology. The default Derby datasource and PostgreSQL are not affected because they do not interpret backslash as an escape character in this context. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 24.09.08, which fixes this issue. |
| Missing Authorization in ProductSearchEvents in Apache OFBiz 24.09 before 24.09.08 on all platforms allows a remote authenticated attacker holding only catalog view permission to bulk-modify product category and feature associations across arbitrary search results by seeding a broad product search and then invoking search-result mutation events such as searchRemoveFromCategory, searchExpireFromCategory, searchAddToCategory, searchAddFeature, and searchRemoveFeature, causing the servlet to authorize the request against only the base view-level permission declared on the request-map while the underlying event methods perform bulk entity-engine deletes/inserts without checking the DELETE/CREATE permission enforced by the equivalent service-layer operations (e.g. removeProductFromCategory). Users are recommended to upgrade to version 24.09.08, which fixes this issue. |
| Release of invalid pointer or reference in Desktop Window Manager allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| No cwe for this issue in Desktop Window Manager allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Untrusted pointer dereference in Windows Graphics Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Incorrect authorization in Windows Clipboard Virtual Channel Extension allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Saxy's XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between <? and ?>, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it.
Because ?> terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching <? keeps the encoder's own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction.
The result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
| XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1 serializes a {:cdata, characters} node by wrapping the supplied characters between <![CDATA[ and ]]> and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder's character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters <, >, &, ", and ', but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a ]]> substring is to split the section and rejoin it as ]]]]><![CDATA[>. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.
An application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with Saxy.XML.cdata/1 and serializing it with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the ]]> is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
| XML injection in the encoder of Saxy. Saxy.Encoder does not neutralize the -- sequence in XML comment content: escape_comment/2 returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single -, so neither an interior -- nor a full --> is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the <!-- and --> delimiters.
When an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with --> and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
