| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Integer overflow in Media in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| In rw_t4t_update_file of rw_t4t.cc, there is a possible out-of-bounds write due to an integer overflow. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/iommu: Fix the overflow validation in iommu_tce_check_ioba
The commit b1af23d836f8 ("KVM: PPC: iommu: Unify TCE checking") unified
IOBA parameter checking across KVM and VFIO into iommu_tce_check_ioba().
While doing so, the passed in argument npages is ignored and constant
value '1' is used leaving out a possible overflow as the callers can
legitimately be using npages > 1 for H_STUFF_TCE or H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT
cases.
Fix this by accounting for 'npages', checking for arithmetic overflow,
and verifying that the entire requested range (ioba - offset + npages)
does not exceed the table capacity 'size'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dma-buf: Fix silent overflow for phys vec to sgt
In case MMIO size is bigger than 4G and peer2peer DMA goes
through host bridge, we trigger a code path that assigns the
total linked IOVA (which is greater than 4G) to mapped_len.
Previously, `mapped_len` was declared as 32-bit `unsigned int`.
When accumulating `size_t` lengths, this leads to a silent wrap-around.
This truncation causes truncated lengths to be passed to functions
like `fill_sg_entry()`.
Fix this by changing `mapped_len` to `size_t` (64-bit). While
at it, fix similar potential overflow issues in `calc_sg_nents`
by using `check_add_overflow()` for `nents` and using
`unsigned int` for the loop iterator in `fill_sg_entry` to match. |
| H5Z__filter_fletcher32 in H5Zfletcher32.c in HDF5 prior to 2.3.0 computes the data length to checksum by subtracting the 4-byte trailing checksum size from the input buffer size without checking that the buffer is at least 4 bytes, allowing a size_t underflow. This allows attackers to cause a denial of service (massively out-of-bounds read and application crash in H5_checksum_fletcher32) via a crafted HDF5 file with a Fletcher32-filtered chunk smaller than 4 bytes, triggered via H5Dread, e.g. by the h5ls or h5dump tools. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0841, prop_add_one() in src/textprop.c uses the proplen value from get_text_props() to increment a uint16_t property count beyond 0xffff, wrapping the count to zero and copying existing text-property records into a heap allocation sized for none of them. This issue is fixed in version 9.2.0841. |
| An integer overflow in WSS4J's DER bounds check lets an oversized allocation pass validation. An unauthenticated attacker can send a SOAP message carrying an X.509 certificate whose SubjectKeyIdentifier extension declares a length of 0x7FFFFFFF; WSS4J decodes this while resolving the signature's key reference, before the message is authenticated, so an eleven-byte extension triggers a 2 GB allocation. Repeated requests exhaust server memory.
Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 4.0.2 or 3.0.6 or 2.4.4, which fix this issue. |
| OpenAPV before 1.1.1.0 has a read_bitstream heap-based buffer overflow. |
| GNU Aspell contains an integer truncation vulnerability in the WritableDict::add() function in modules/speller/default/writable.cpp. When loading a personal wordlist, the word length is stored as a single byte, causing truncation for words whose length is a multiple of 256. This leads to heap corruption. An attacker can exploit this by convincing a user to run aspell with a crafted personal wordlist containing such a word, resulting in denial of service.
This issue was fixed in commit 782ce94e4dc71eaec4ee1bd945eb3b9c47c5387d which will be released in version 0.60.8.3. |
| Integer overflow in mod_dav_fs in Apache HTTP Server through 2.4.68 allows an authenticated WebDAV client with write access to crash worker processes and persistently corrupt a directory's property database via PROPPATCH requests declaring many XML namespaces. |
| Integer overflow in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.97 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Integer overflow in Compositing in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.97 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU
This commit bounds cork->base.fragsize to IP6_MAX_MTU for UDP sockets to
avoid a possible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in
udp_set_len_short when setsockopt IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER is set to
IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO or IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over
a netdev with an unusually large MTU.
Steps to reproduce (included in the new selftest):
1. Set device MTU bigger than IP6_MAX_MTU. cork->base.fragsize will be
set to that MTU in ip6_setup_cork.
2. Set IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER to IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE or IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO. It
lets maxnonfragsize be set to device MTU (cork->fragsize) in
__ip6_append_data, rather than to IP6_MAX_MTU.
3. Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +40 bytes of
IPv6 header). Device MTU allows it (it's only one byte bigger than
IP6_MAX_MTU, and the device MTU is bigger than that).
4. The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the
16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short.
To avoid breaking sending UDP jumbograms over raw IPv6 sockets, limit
the change to UDP sockets only.
The original overflow bug with IPv6 and IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO seems to
predate git history (verified reproduction on 2.6.21), was fixed later,
and then reappeared in commit 427faee167bc ("net: ipv6: introduce
ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), which is chosen as the Fixes tag here. The
overflow with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE reproduces since its introduction in
commit 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Fix integer overflow in acpi_ex_opcode_3A_1T_1R() (mid_op)
Add overflow check for Index + Length to prevent integer overflow
when calculating the truncation length. This prevents negative
size parameter being passed to memcpy(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fail verification for sign-extension of packet data/data_end/data_meta
syzbot reported a kernel crash due to
commit 1f1e864b6555 ("bpf: Handle sign-extenstin ctx member accesses").
The reason is due to sign-extension of 32-bit load for
packet data/data_end/data_meta uapi field.
The original code looks like:
r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff->data */
r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) /* load __sk_buff->data_end */
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto +1
...
Note that __sk_buff->data load has 32-bit sign extension.
After verification and convert_ctx_accesses(), the final asm code looks like:
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)
r2 = (s32)r2
r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto pc+1
...
Note that 'r2 = (s32)r2' may make the kernel __sk_buff->data address invalid
which may cause runtime failure.
Currently, in C code, typically we have
void *data = (void *)(long)skb->data;
void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end;
...
and it will generate
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)
r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto pc+1
If we allow sign-extension,
void *data = (void *)(long)(int)skb->data;
void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end;
...
the generated code looks like
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +208)
r2 <<= 32
r2 s>>= 32
r3 = *(u64 *)(r1 +80)
r0 = r2
r0 += 8
if r3 > r0 goto pc+1
and this will cause verification failure since "r2 <<= 32" is not allowed
as "r2" is a packet pointer.
To fix this issue for case
r2 = *(s32 *)(r1 + 76) /* load __sk_buff->data */
this patch added additional checking in is_valid_access() callback
function for packet data/data_end/data_meta access. If those accesses
are with sign-extenstion, the verification will fail.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000c90eee061d236d37@google.com/ |
| Allocation of resources without limits or throttling, Integer overflow or wraparound, Heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Apache Thrift.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue. |
| Stack-based Buffer Overflow, Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability in Apache Thrift php bindings.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound vulnerability in Samsung Open Source rlottie allows Overflow Buffers.
This issue affects . |
| In tt_face_colr_blend_layer of ttcolr.c, there is a possible remote code execution due to an integer overflow. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| U-Boot before 2026.10-rc4 contains an integer overflow vulnerability in sqfs_read_directory_table() function when allocating the directory table buffer. Attackers can supply a crafted SquashFS image with an attacker-controlled superblock metablks_count value that causes heap buffer under-allocation and out-of-bounds writes, corrupting heap memory and crashing the bootloader. |
