| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in the SAML 1.1 XML parsing logic of Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. The issue occurs when the parser encounters unexpected elements within a security token's key information section, causing the processing thread to enter an infinite loop. An unauthenticated remote attacker could exploit this by sending specially crafted requests, leading to 100% CPU usage and a total denial of service that requires a server restart to resolve. |
| A flaw was found in the SAML XML processing component of Keycloak, an open-source identity and access management solution. The issue occurs when the server parses XML documents containing excessively long dateTime or duration values. Because these strings are not properly validated before processing, the XML parser consumes excessive CPU time. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this by sending specially crafted SAML requests to the server, leading to high CPU utilization and a denial of service for all users. |
| A flaw was found in the authentication session handling of the keycloak-services component in Keycloak. The issue occurs because the system fails to verify if an authenticator is valid for the current authentication flow when switching between the standard authentication path and the reset credentials path. An authenticated attacker can exploit this by triggering a race condition during the credential reset process to associate their successful authentication state with another user's session. This can result in the attacker gaining full access to the victim's account and changing their password. |
| A flaw was found in the protocol mapper and identity resolution components of Keycloak. The issue occurs when a client manager uses hardcoded-claim mappers to override identity claims in sessionless service-account tokens. Because these tokens lack a session ID, Keycloak may incorrectly resolve the token bearer as a different, highly privileged user based on the manipulated claims. This can allow an attacker with limited client management permissions to impersonate a realm administrator and gain full control over the realm. |
| A flaw was found in the idp-auto-link authenticator of the keycloak-services component, which handles user identity federation. The issue occurs when Keycloak automatically links an incoming identity from an external provider to an existing local account based on an email address without verifying if the provider has validated that email. This can allow an attacker to take over a victim's account by using a matching unverified email address at a brokered provider. |
| A flaw was found in the Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA) implementation of Keycloak. The CIBA endpoint fails to properly validate the sub parameter, allowing it to be stored as an additional request parameter. During the token issuance process, this injected value overwrites the legitimate subject identifier. This allows an attacker to authenticate as themselves but receive security tokens belonging to a different victim user, leading to unauthorized account access. |
| A flaw was found in the Keycloak Admin CLI kcadm tool, which is used by administrators to manage Keycloak servers from the command line. When a custom truststore is provided to verify the server identity, the tool incorrectly accepts any self-signed certificate as long as the hostname matches. This allows a network attacker to impersonate the Keycloak server, steal administrative credentials, and perform unauthorized management actions. |
| A flaw was found in the SAML adapter component of Keycloak, which is used to secure applications with SAML-based authentication. The adapter fails to verify that the issuer of a signed SAML assertion matches the expected identity provider configured for the application. If multiple identity providers share the same trusted signing key, an attacker who controls one of those providers can create a validly signed assertion to log into the application as any user, potentially gaining full administrative control. |
| A flaw was found in Netty. A remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit a vulnerability in Netty's HTTP/1 to HTTP/2 conversion process. When an HTTP/1 request includes both an absolute-form request-target and a conflicting Host header, Netty incorrectly prioritizes the Host header for the HTTP/2 :authority field, discarding the original request-target authority. This inconsistency can allow an attacker to bypass security controls in Netty-based proxies or gateways, potentially leading to unauthorized access, cache poisoning, or misrouting of requests. |
| A flaw was found in Netty. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 Extended CONNECT requests. Netty's HTTP-object conversion path incorrectly processes these requests as regular HTTP/1.1 CONNECT requests, leading to a loss of critical protocol and path information. This misinterpretation can allow attackers to bypass security policies, such as routing or authorization logic, in applications that rely on Netty for HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 communication, resulting in integrity loss. |
| A flaw was found in Netty's HTTP/2 codec. When converting HTTP/1 CONNECT requests to HTTP/2, the component incorrectly uses the Host header instead of the CONNECT authority-form request-target for the tunnel authority. A remote attacker can exploit this by supplying a different Host header, leading to a malformed HTTP/2 CONNECT request. This can bypass security controls such as tunnel allow-lists or egress policies, resulting in integrity loss. |
| A flaw was found in Netty RtspDecoder. The `RtspMethods.valueOf()` function incorrectly strips trailing control bytes from method tokens in Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) requests. A remote attacker can exploit this by sending a specially crafted RTSP request, leading to method-token smuggling. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass method-based access controls and can also be used to launder malicious requests through Netty-based RTSP proxies, making them appear legitimate to backend systems. |
| A flaw was found in Netty. A reference-count leak in the HAProxy PROXY-v2 message decoder allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to send specially crafted PROXY-protocol v2 headers. This can lead to memory exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the affected system. |
| A flaw was found in Netty's WebSocketServerExtensionHandler. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability by using HTTP/1.1 pipelining to send requests faster than the application can respond. This leads to an unbounded growth of a per-connection queue, consuming excessive memory. Eventually, this can cause the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to exhaust its heap, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the affected server. |
| A flaw was found in Netty's HttpServerCodec. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability by pipelining HTTP/1.1 requests on a single connection and withholding reads. This action causes the methodOverflowQueue to grow without limit, leading to unbounded heap memory consumption and a denial of service due to memory exhaustion. |
| A flaw was found in Netty. SpdySessionHandler accepts an unlimited number of concurrent remote-initiated streams because localConcurrentStreams defaults to Integer.MAX_VALUE and the handler provides no API to change it. A remote peer can open a SPDY connection and send a large number of SYN_STREAM frames with FLAG_FIN=0, causing unbounded heap and direct memory allocation that can lead to JVM OutOfMemoryError and a denial of service. |
| Keycloak provides a Dynamic Client Registration feature that allows users with specific tokens to register their own applications. A flaw in how Keycloak validates these registration requests allows an attacker to create a malicious application that forges identity information. By mapping their own user profile details to protected fields like the user ID (sub) or intended audience (aud), an attacker can generate signed security tokens that make them appear to be a different user. This could allow an attacker to impersonate other users or gain unauthorized access to services that rely on these tokens for identity verification. |
| A flaw was found in the SAML identity broker component of Keycloak, which is used to delegate authentication to external identity providers. The issue occurs because the broker fails to verify that a user actually possesses the private key associated with a holder-of-key assertion. An attacker who intercepts a victim signed assertion can replay it to gain unauthorized access and impersonate the victim without needing their private key. |
| XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1 serializes a {:cdata, characters} node by wrapping the supplied characters between <![CDATA[ and ]]> and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder's character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters <, >, &, ", and ', but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a ]]> substring is to split the section and rejoin it as ]]]]><![CDATA[>. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring.
An application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with Saxy.XML.cdata/1 and serializing it with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the ]]> is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
| Saxy's XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between <? and ?>, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it.
Because ?> terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching <? keeps the encoder's own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction.
The result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
