| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| DBI versions before 1.656 for Perl hang on a later open of a DBD::DBM table because a failed open_data does not release the table's lock.
open_data creates the table's lock file and takes an exclusive flock on it for a CREATE, before the checks that can croak: a dbm_mldbm value that is not a module name, a failing tie, or a missing data file. The croak unwinds before the table object is blessed, so nothing releases the lock, and the meta data holding the open descriptor stays cached on the database handle.
The dbm_mldbm and dbm_type values come from the DSN or the connect attributes, so a caller that chooses the serializer or the storage backend can trigger the failure.
The flock has no timeout, so a later open of that table (even through a separate database handle) blocks for as long as the handle holding the stale lock lives, in the same process or any other. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential deadlock when reconnecting channels
Fix cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() to take the correct lock order
and prevent the following deadlock from happening
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.16.0-rc3-build2+ #1301 Tainted: G S W
------------------------------------------------------
cifsd/6055 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88810ad56038 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
__lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
cifs_setup_session+0x81/0x4b0
cifs_get_smb_ses+0x771/0x900
cifs_mount_get_session+0x7e/0x170
cifs_mount+0x92/0x2d0
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x161/0x460
smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90
vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0
path_mount+0x6ee/0x740
do_mount+0x98/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
-> #1 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
__lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
cifs_match_super+0x101/0x320
sget+0xab/0x270
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e0/0x460
smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90
vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0
path_mount+0x6ee/0x740
do_mount+0x98/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
-> #0 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_noncircular+0x95/0xc0
check_prev_add+0x115/0x2f0
validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
__lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200
__cifs_reconnect+0x8f/0x500
cifs_handle_standard+0x112/0x280
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x64d/0xbc0
kthread+0x2f7/0x310
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x230
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&tcp_ses->srv_lock --> &ret_buf->ses_lock --> &ret_buf->chan_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock);
lock(&ret_buf->ses_lock);
lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock);
lock(&tcp_ses->srv_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by cifsd/6055:
#0: ffffffff857de398 (&cifs_tcp_ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x7b/0x200
#1: ffff888119c64060 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x9c/0x200
#2: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: add srng->lock for ath11k_hal_srng_* in monitor mode
ath11k_hal_srng_* should be used with srng->lock to protect srng data.
For ath11k_dp_rx_mon_dest_process() and ath11k_dp_full_mon_process_rx(),
they use ath11k_hal_srng_* for many times but never call srng->lock.
So when running (full) monitor mode, warning will occur:
RIP: 0010:ath11k_hal_srng_dst_peek+0x18/0x30 [ath11k]
Call Trace:
? ath11k_hal_srng_dst_peek+0x18/0x30 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status+0xc45/0x1190 [ath11k]
? idr_alloc_u32+0x97/0xd0
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x32a/0x550 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x289/0x5a0 [ath11k]
ath11k_pcic_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x30/0xd0 [ath11k]
__napi_poll+0x30/0x1f0
net_rx_action+0x198/0x320
__do_softirq+0xdd/0x319
So add srng->lock for them to avoid such warnings.
Inorder to fetch the srng->lock, should change srng's definition from
'void' to 'struct hal_srng'. And initialize them elsewhere to prevent
one line of code from being too long. This is consistent with other ring
process functions, such as ath11k_dp_process_rx().
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30
Tested-on: QCN9074 hw1.0 PCI WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix ABBA deadlock in ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find()
Syzbot/stress-ng reported an ABBA deadlock in ext4 when exercising
concurrent xattr workloads (using the ea_inode mount/format option).
The deadlock occurs between the running transaction and the eviction
thread:
- Task 1 (stress-ng): Holds a reference to a shared mbcache_entry (ce)
and calls ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find() -> ext4_iget() to retrieve
the corresponding EA inode. Since the EA inode is currently being
evicted, ext4_iget() blocks in __wait_on_freeing_inode() waiting for
eviction to complete.
- Task 2 (eviction thread): Currently evicting the same EA inode in
ext4_evict_ea_inode(). It calls mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(oe) which
blocks waiting for Task 1 to release the reference to the mbcache_entry.
To break this deadlock, implement a new ext4_iget() configuration flag
named EXT4_IGET_NOWAIT. When set, perform a non-blocking lookup of the
inode via VFS's find_inode_nowait() API.
If the inode is currently being evicted (marked with I_FREEING or
I_WILL_FREE) or created (I_CREATING), or if it is not present in the VFS
inode cache (cache miss), simply skip it (returning -ENOENT) rather than
waiting for eviction/creation to complete, breaking the ABBA cycle.
Since we return -ENOENT immediately on a cache miss, we never attempt to
allocate a new inode or call iget_locked(), completely eliminating any
TOCTOU race window.
If the returned inode is I_NEW, wait for its initialization to clear via
wait_on_new_inode(). If initialization fails and the inode is unhashed
during wait_on_new_inode() waking up (e.g., due to an I/O read error in
another thread), safely drop the reference and return -ENOENT. This
unhashed check is executed unconditionally on all cache-hit pathways to
properly handle concurrent initialization failures.
Finally, standard validation checks (including is_bad_inode,
EXT4_EA_INODE_FL, file_acl, and xattr flags) are executed as normal inside
check_igot_inode() to fully guarantee VFS-layer safety.
In ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find(), invoke ext4_iget() with the new
EXT4_IGET_NOWAIT flag to perform the non-blocking cache search. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix deadlock between reflink and transaction commit when using flushoncommit
When using the flushoncommit mount option, we can have a deadlock between
a transaction commit and a reflink operation that copied an inline extent
to an offset beyond the current i_size of the destination node.
The deadlock happens like this:
1) Task A clones an inline extent from inode X to an offset of inode Y
that is beyond Y's current i_size. This means we copied the inline
extent's data to a folio of inode Y that is beyond its EOF, using a
call to copy_inline_to_page();
2) Task B starts a transaction commit and calls
btrfs_start_delalloc_flush() to flush delalloc;
3) The delalloc flushing sees the new dirty folio of inode Y and when it
attempts to flush it, it ends up at extent_writepage() and sees that
the offset of the folio is beyond the i_size of inode Y, so it attempts
to invalidate the folio by calling folio_invalidate(), which ends up at
btrfs' folio invalidate callback - btrfs_invalidate_folio(). There it
tries to lock the folio's range in inode Y's extent io tree, but it
blocks since it's currently locked by task A - during a reflink we lock
the inodes and the source and destination ranges after flushing all
delalloc and waiting for ordered extent completion - after that we
don't expect to have dirty folios in the ranges, the exception is if
we have to copy an inline extent's data (because the destination offset
is not zero);
4) Task A then attempts to start a transaction to update the inode item,
and then it's blocked since the current transaction is in the
TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START state. Therefore task A has to wait for the
current transaction to become unblocked (its state >=
TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED).
So task A is waiting for the transaction commit done by task B, and
the later waiting on the extent lock of inode Y that is currently
held by task A.
Syzbot recently reported this with the following stack traces:
INFO: task kworker/u8:7:1053 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u8:7 state:D stack:23520 pid:1053 tgid:1053 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-46)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5298 [inline]
__schedule+0x1553/0x5240 kernel/sched/core.c:6911
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6993 [inline]
schedule+0x164/0x360 kernel/sched/core.c:7008
wait_extent_bit fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:811 [inline]
btrfs_lock_extent_bits+0x59c/0x700 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:1914
btrfs_lock_extent fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.h:152 [inline]
btrfs_invalidate_folio+0x43d/0xc40 fs/btrfs/inode.c:7704
extent_writepage fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1852 [inline]
extent_write_cache_pages fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2580 [inline]
btrfs_writepages+0x12ff/0x2440 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2713
do_writepages+0x32e/0x550 mm/page-writeback.c:2554
__writeback_single_inode+0x133/0x11a0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1750
writeback_sb_inodes+0x995/0x19d0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2042
wb_writeback+0x456/0xb70 fs/fs-writeback.c:2227
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2374 [inline]
wb_workfn+0x41a/0xf60 fs/fs-writeback.c:2414
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3276 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xb6e/0x18c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3359
worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0 kernel/workqueue.c:3440
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x51e/0xb90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
INFO: task syz.4.64:6910 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz.4.64 state:D stack:22752 pid:6910 tgid:
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: vport: fix self-deadlock on release of tunnel ports
vports are used concurrently and protected by RCU, so netdev_put()
must happen after the RCU grace period. So, either in an RCU call or
after the synchronize_net(). The rtnl_delete_link() must happen under
RTNL and so can't be executed in RCU context. Calling synchronize_net()
while holding RTNL is not a good idea for performance and system
stability under load in general, so calling netdev_put() in RCU call
is the right solution here.
However,
when the device is deleted, rtnl_unlock() will call netdev_run_todo()
and block until all the references are gone. In the current code this
means that we never reach the call_rcu() and the vport is never freed
and the reference is never released, causing a self-deadlock on device
removal.
Fix that by moving the rcu_call() before the rtnl_unlock(), so the
scheduled RCU callback will be executed when synchronize_net() is
called from the rtnl_unlock()->netdev_run_todo() while the RTNL itself
is already released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: move wait_on_sem() out of spinlock
With iommu.strict=1, the existing completion wait path can cause soft
lockups under stressed environment, as wait_on_sem() busy-waits under the
spinlock with interrupts disabled.
Move the completion wait in iommu_completion_wait() out of the spinlock.
wait_on_sem() only polls the hardware-updated cmd_sem and does not require
iommu->lock, so holding the lock during the busy wait unnecessarily
increases contention and extends the time with interrupts disabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix locking usage for tcon fields
We used to use the cifs_tcp_ses_lock to protect a lot of objects
that are not just the server, ses or tcon lists. We later introduced
srv_lock, ses_lock and tc_lock to protect fields within the
corresponding structs. This was done to provide a more granular
protection and avoid unnecessary serialization.
There were still a couple of uses of cifs_tcp_ses_lock to provide
tcon fields. In this patch, I've replaced them with tc_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: move async event work off nvmet-wq
For target nvmet_ctrl_free() flushes ctrl->async_event_work.
If nvmet_ctrl_free() runs on nvmet-wq, the flush re-enters workqueue
completion for the same worker:-
A. Async event work queued on nvmet-wq (prior to disconnect):
nvmet_execute_async_event()
queue_work(nvmet_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work)
nvmet_add_async_event()
queue_work(nvmet_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work)
B. Full pre-work chain (RDMA CM path):
nvmet_rdma_cm_handler()
nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect()
__nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect()
queue_work(nvmet_wq, &queue->release_work)
process_one_work()
lock((wq_completion)nvmet-wq) <--------- 1st
nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work()
C. Recursive path (same worker):
nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work()
nvmet_rdma_free_queue()
nvmet_sq_destroy()
nvmet_ctrl_put()
nvmet_ctrl_free()
flush_work(&ctrl->async_event_work)
__flush_work()
touch_wq_lockdep_map()
lock((wq_completion)nvmet-wq) <--------- 2nd
Lockdep splat:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.19.0-rc3nvme+ #14 Tainted: G N
--------------------------------------------
kworker/u192:42/44933 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888118a00948 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888118a00948 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53e/0x660
3 locks held by kworker/u192:42/44933:
#0: ffff888118a00948 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53e/0x660
#1: ffffc9000e6cbe28 ((work_completion)(&queue->release_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c5/0x660
#2: ffffffff82d4db60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0x62/0x530
Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work [nvmet_rdma]
Call Trace:
__flush_work+0x268/0x530
nvmet_ctrl_free+0x140/0x310 [nvmet]
nvmet_cq_put+0x74/0x90 [nvmet]
nvmet_rdma_free_queue+0x23/0xe0 [nvmet_rdma]
nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work+0x19/0x50 [nvmet_rdma]
process_one_work+0x206/0x660
worker_thread+0x184/0x320
kthread+0x10c/0x240
ret_from_fork+0x319/0x390
Move async event work to a dedicated nvmet-aen-wq to avoid reentrant
flush on nvmet-wq. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/core) Protect regulator operations with mutex
The regulator operations pmbus_regulator_get_voltage(),
pmbus_regulator_set_voltage(), and pmbus_regulator_list_voltage()
access PMBus registers and shared data but were not protected by
the update_lock mutex. This could lead to race conditions.
However, adding mutex protection directly to these functions causes
a deadlock because pmbus_regulator_notify() (which calls
regulator_notifier_call_chain()) is often called with the mutex
already held (e.g., from pmbus_fault_handler()). If a regulator
callback then calls one of the now-protected voltage functions,
it will attempt to acquire the same mutex.
Rework pmbus_regulator_notify() to utilize a worker function to
send notifications outside of the mutex protection. Events are
stored as atomics in a per-page bitmask and processed by the worker.
Initialize the worker and its associated data during regulator
registration, and ensure it is cancelled on device removal using
devm_add_action_or_reset().
While at it, remove the unnecessary include of linux/of.h. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: Fix circular locking dependency in rds_tcp_tune
syzbot reported a circular locking dependency in rds_tcp_tune() where
sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() is called while holding the socket lock:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
======================================================
kworker/u10:8/15040 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8e9aaf80 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x4b/0x6f0
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88805a3c1ce0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: rds_tcp_tune+0xd7/0x930
The issue occurs because sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() performs memory
allocation (via get_net_track() -> ref_tracker_alloc()) while the
socket lock is held, creating a circular dependency with fs_reclaim.
Fix this by moving sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() outside the socket lock
critical section. This is safe because the fields modified by the
sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() call (sk_net_refcnt, ns_tracker) are not
accessed by any concurrent code path at this point.
v2:
- Corrected fixes tag
- check patch line wrap nits
- ai commentary nits |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pNFS: Fix a deadlock when returning a delegation during open()
Ben Coddington reports seeing a hang in the following stack trace:
0 [ffffd0b50e1774e0] __schedule at ffffffff9ca05415
1 [ffffd0b50e177548] schedule at ffffffff9ca05717
2 [ffffd0b50e177558] bit_wait at ffffffff9ca061e1
3 [ffffd0b50e177568] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff9ca05cfb
4 [ffffd0b50e1775c8] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff9ca05ea5
5 [ffffd0b50e177618] pnfs_roc at ffffffffc154207b [nfsv4]
6 [ffffd0b50e1776b8] _nfs4_proc_delegreturn at ffffffffc1506586 [nfsv4]
7 [ffffd0b50e177788] nfs4_proc_delegreturn at ffffffffc1507480 [nfsv4]
8 [ffffd0b50e1777f8] nfs_do_return_delegation at ffffffffc1523e41 [nfsv4]
9 [ffffd0b50e177838] nfs_inode_set_delegation at ffffffffc1524a75 [nfsv4]
10 [ffffd0b50e177888] nfs4_process_delegation at ffffffffc14f41dd [nfsv4]
11 [ffffd0b50e1778a0] _nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state at ffffffffc1503edf [nfsv4]
12 [ffffd0b50e1778c0] _nfs4_open_and_get_state at ffffffffc1504e56 [nfsv4]
13 [ffffd0b50e177978] _nfs4_do_open at ffffffffc15051b8 [nfsv4]
14 [ffffd0b50e1779f8] nfs4_do_open at ffffffffc150559c [nfsv4]
15 [ffffd0b50e177a80] nfs4_atomic_open at ffffffffc15057fb [nfsv4]
16 [ffffd0b50e177ad0] nfs4_file_open at ffffffffc15219be [nfsv4]
17 [ffffd0b50e177b78] do_dentry_open at ffffffff9c09e6ea
18 [ffffd0b50e177ba8] vfs_open at ffffffff9c0a082e
19 [ffffd0b50e177bd0] dentry_open at ffffffff9c0a0935
The issue is that the delegreturn is being asked to wait for a layout
return that cannot complete because a state recovery was initiated. The
state recovery cannot complete until the open() finishes processing the
delegations it was given.
The solution is to propagate the existing flags that indicate a
non-blocking call to the function pnfs_roc(), so that it knows not to
wait in this situation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmalloc, mm/kasan: respect gfp mask in kasan_populate_vmalloc()
kasan_populate_vmalloc() and its helpers ignore the caller's gfp_mask and
always allocate memory using the hardcoded GFP_KERNEL flag. This makes
them inconsistent with vmalloc(), which was recently extended to support
GFP_NOFS and GFP_NOIO allocations.
Page table allocations performed during shadow population also ignore the
external gfp_mask. To preserve the intended semantics of GFP_NOFS and
GFP_NOIO, wrap the apply_to_page_range() calls into the appropriate
memalloc scope.
xfs calls vmalloc with GFP_NOFS, so this bug could lead to deadlock.
There was a report here
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/686ea951.050a0220.385921.0016.GAE@google.com
This patch:
- Extends kasan_populate_vmalloc() and helpers to take gfp_mask;
- Passes gfp_mask down to alloc_pages_bulk() and __get_free_page();
- Enforces GFP_NOFS/NOIO semantics with memalloc_*_save()/restore()
around apply_to_page_range();
- Updates vmalloc.c and percpu allocator call sites accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Optimize module load time by optimizing PLT/GOT counting
When enabling CONFIG_KASAN, CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY_BUILD and
CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY at the same time, there will be soft deadlock,
the relevant logs are as follows:
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
...
Call Trace:
[<900000000024f9e4>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
[<90000000002482f4>] dump_stack_lvl+0x94/0xbc
[<9000000000224544>] rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x1fc/0x280
[<900000000037ac80>] rcu_sched_clock_irq+0x720/0xf88
[<9000000000396c34>] update_process_times+0xb4/0x150
[<90000000003b2474>] tick_nohz_handler+0xf4/0x250
[<9000000000397e28>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1d0/0x428
[<9000000000399b2c>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x214/0x538
[<9000000000253634>] constant_timer_interrupt+0x64/0x80
[<9000000000349938>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x78/0x1a0
[<9000000000349a78>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x18/0x88
[<9000000000354c00>] handle_percpu_irq+0x90/0xf0
[<9000000000348c74>] handle_irq_desc+0x94/0xb8
[<9000000001012b28>] handle_cpu_irq+0x68/0xa0
[<9000000001def8c0>] handle_loongarch_irq+0x30/0x48
[<9000000001def958>] do_vint+0x80/0xd0
[<9000000000268a0c>] kasan_mem_to_shadow.part.0+0x2c/0x2a0
[<90000000006344f4>] __asan_load8+0x4c/0x120
[<900000000025c0d0>] module_frob_arch_sections+0x5c8/0x6b8
[<90000000003895f0>] load_module+0x9e0/0x2958
[<900000000038b770>] __do_sys_init_module+0x208/0x2d0
[<9000000001df0c34>] do_syscall+0x94/0x190
[<900000000024d6fc>] handle_syscall+0xbc/0x158
After analysis, this is because the slow speed of loading the amdgpu
module leads to the long time occupation of the cpu and then the soft
deadlock.
When loading a module, module_frob_arch_sections() tries to figure out
the number of PLTs/GOTs that will be needed to handle all the RELAs. It
will call the count_max_entries() to find in an out-of-order date which
counting algorithm has O(n^2) complexity.
To make it faster, we sort the relocation list by info and addend. That
way, to check for a duplicate relocation, it just needs to compare with
the previous entry. This reduces the complexity of the algorithm to O(n
log n), as done in commit d4e0340919fb ("arm64/module: Optimize module
load time by optimizing PLT counting"). This gives sinificant reduction
in module load time for modules with large number of relocations.
After applying this patch, the soft deadlock problem has been solved,
and the kernel starts normally without "Call Trace".
Using the default configuration to test some modules, the results are as
follows:
Module Size
ip_tables 36K
fat 143K
radeon 2.5MB
amdgpu 16MB
Without this patch:
Module Module load time (ms) Count(PLTs/GOTs)
ip_tables 18 59/6
fat 0 162/14
radeon 54 1221/84
amdgpu 1411 4525/1098
With this patch:
Module Module load time (ms) Count(PLTs/GOTs)
ip_tables 18 59/6
fat 0 162/14
radeon 22 1221/84
amdgpu 45 4525/1098 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/mm: Fix in_atomic() handling in do_secure_storage_access()
Kernel user spaces accesses to not exported pages in atomic context
incorrectly try to resolve the page fault.
With debug options enabled call traces like this can be seen:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1523
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 419074, name: qemu-system-s39
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
Preemption disabled at:
[<00000383ea47cfa2>] copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xa2/0x8a0
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 419074 Comm: qemu-system-s39
Tainted: G W 6.16.0-20250531.rc0.git0.69b3a602feac.63.fc42.s390x+debug #1 PREEMPT
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 703 (LPAR)
Call Trace:
[<00000383e990d282>] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xe8
[<00000383e99bf152>] __might_resched+0x292/0x2d0
[<00000383eaa7c374>] down_read+0x34/0x2d0
[<00000383e99432f8>] do_secure_storage_access+0x108/0x360
[<00000383eaa724b0>] __do_pgm_check+0x130/0x220
[<00000383eaa842e4>] pgm_check_handler+0x114/0x160
[<00000383ea47d028>] copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0x128/0x8a0
([<00000383ea47d016>] copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0x116/0x8a0)
[<00000383e9c45eae>] generic_perform_write+0x16e/0x310
[<00000383e9eb87f4>] ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x84/0x160
[<00000383e9da0de4>] vfs_write+0x1c4/0x460
[<00000383e9da123c>] ksys_write+0x7c/0x100
[<00000383eaa7284e>] __do_syscall+0x15e/0x280
[<00000383eaa8417e>] system_call+0x6e/0x90
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
It is not allowed to take the mmap_lock while in atomic context. Therefore
handle such a secure storage access fault as if the accessed page is not
mapped: the uaccess function will return -EFAULT, and the caller has to
deal with this. Usually this means that the access is retried in process
context, which allows to resolve the page fault (or in this case export the
page). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix potential deadloop in prepare_compress_overwrite()
Jan Prusakowski reported a kernel hang issue as below:
When running xfstests on linux-next kernel (6.14.0-rc3, 6.12) I
encountered a problem in generic/475 test where fsstress process
gets blocked in __f2fs_write_data_pages() and the test hangs.
The options I used are:
MKFS_OPTIONS -- -O compression -O extra_attr -O project_quota -O quota /dev/vdc
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- -o acl,user_xattr -o discard,compress_extension=* /dev/vdc /vdc
INFO: task kworker/u8:0:11 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-xfstests-lockdep #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u8:0 state:D stack:0 pid:11 tgid:11 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208160 flags:0x00004000
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x309/0x8e0
schedule+0x3a/0x100
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30
__mutex_lock+0x59a/0xdb0
__f2fs_write_data_pages+0x3ac/0x400
do_writepages+0xe8/0x290
__writeback_single_inode+0x5c/0x360
writeback_sb_inodes+0x22f/0x570
wb_writeback+0xb0/0x410
wb_do_writeback+0x47/0x2f0
wb_workfn+0x5a/0x1c0
process_one_work+0x223/0x5b0
worker_thread+0x1d5/0x3c0
kthread+0xfd/0x230
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
The root cause is: once generic/475 starts toload error table to dm
device, f2fs_prepare_compress_overwrite() will loop reading compressed
cluster pages due to IO error, meanwhile it has held .writepages lock,
it can block all other writeback tasks.
Let's fix this issue w/ below changes:
- add f2fs_handle_page_eio() in prepare_compress_overwrite() to
detect IO error.
- detect cp_error earler in f2fs_read_multi_pages(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ibmveth: make veth_pool_store stop hanging
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text
Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.
Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.
I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:
Setting pool0/active to 0
Setting pool1/active to 1
[ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
Setting pool1/active to 1
Setting pool1/active to 0
[ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
[ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
[ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
[ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
[ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
[ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
[ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8
[ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
[ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace:
[ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
[ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
[ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
[ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
[ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
[ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
[ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
[ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
[ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
[ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
[ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
[ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
[ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
[ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
[ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
...
[ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
[ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
[ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
[ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
[ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
[ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
[ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
[ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
[ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
[ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
[ 243.
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: IDLETIMER: Fix for possible ABBA deadlock
Deletion of the last rule referencing a given idletimer may happen at
the same time as a read of its file in sysfs:
| ======================================================
| WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
| 6.12.0-rc7-01692-g5e9a28f41134-dirty #594 Not tainted
| ------------------------------------------------------
| iptables/3303 is trying to acquire lock:
| ffff8881057e04b8 (kn->active#48){++++}-{0:0}, at: __kernfs_remove+0x20
|
| but task is already holding lock:
| ffffffffa0249068 (list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: idletimer_tg_destroy_v]
|
| which lock already depends on the new lock.
A simple reproducer is:
| #!/bin/bash
|
| while true; do
| iptables -A INPUT -i foo -j IDLETIMER --timeout 10 --label "testme"
| iptables -D INPUT -i foo -j IDLETIMER --timeout 10 --label "testme"
| done &
| while true; do
| cat /sys/class/xt_idletimer/timers/testme >/dev/null
| done
Avoid this by freeing list_mutex right after deleting the element from
the list, then continuing with the teardown. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinmux: Use sequential access to access desc->pinmux data
When two client of the same gpio call pinctrl_select_state() for the
same functionality, we are seeing NULL pointer issue while accessing
desc->mux_owner.
Let's say two processes A, B executing in pin_request() for the same pin
and process A updates the desc->mux_usecount but not yet updated the
desc->mux_owner while process B see the desc->mux_usecount which got
updated by A path and further executes strcmp and while accessing
desc->mux_owner it crashes with NULL pointer.
Serialize the access to mux related setting with a mutex lock.
cpu0 (process A) cpu1(process B)
pinctrl_select_state() { pinctrl_select_state() {
pin_request() { pin_request() {
...
....
} else {
desc->mux_usecount++;
desc->mux_usecount && strcmp(desc->mux_owner, owner)) {
if (desc->mux_usecount > 1)
return 0;
desc->mux_owner = owner;
} } |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pktgen: use cpus_read_lock() in pg_net_init()
I have seen the WARN_ON(smp_processor_id() != cpu) firing
in pktgen_thread_worker() during tests.
We must use cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock()
around the for_each_online_cpu(cpu) loop.
While we are at it use WARN_ON_ONCE() to avoid a possible syslog flood. |
